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Introduction
After a decade of political and administrative reform and several rounds of 
competitive elections, Indonesia, by most accounts, displays a democratic political 
system. There is little consensus on the character of the country's democracy, however. 
Optimists have called Indonesia one of Southeast Asia's most vibrant democracies, a 
claim that, upon a moment's reflection, says remarkably little. It is no coincidence that 
many sunny accounts of Indonesia's politics are fixated on Jakarta and national 
politics, providing a decidedly thin understanding of the actual state of Indonesia's 
political institutions. By contrast, analysts of the country's local politics, though 
cognizant and appreciative of the country's significant democratic gains, have 
presented evidence that questions the quality of the country's democratic institutions.1 
These more critical accounts show that, despite the presence of elections, competitive 
political parties, and a relatively free press, Indonesia's politics are frequently 
determined by such non-democratic mechanisms as corruption, intimidation, and 
clientelism. One common assumption that both optimistic and realistic accounts of
1 See, for instance, Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy, eds., Local Power and Politics in Indonesia: 
Decentralization and Democratisation (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003); Henk Schulte 
Nordholt, "Renegotiating Boundaries: Access, Agency, and Identity in Post-Soeharto Indonesia," Bijdragen 
tot de Taal-, Land-en Volkenkunde (BKI) 159,4 (2003): 550-89; Vedi R. Hadiz, "Indonesian Local Party Politics: 
A Site of Resistance to Neo-Liberal Reform," Critical Asian Studies 36,4 (2004): 615-36; Vedi R. Hadiz, "The 
Localization of Power in Southeast Asia," Democratization 14,5 (2007): 873-92; Nankyung Choi, "Local 
Elections and Party Politics in Post-Reformasi Indonesia: A View from Yogyakarta," Contemporary 
Southeast Asia 26,2 (2004): 280-301; Nankyung Choi, "Local Elections and Democracy in Indonesia: The 
Riau Archipelago," Journal o f Contemporary Asia 37,3 (2007): 326-45; Nankyung Choi, "Elections, Parties, 
and Elites in Indonesia's Local Politics," South East Asia Research 15,3 (2007): 325-54; and Henk Schulte 
Nordholt and Gerry van Klinken, eds., Renegotiating Boundaries: Local Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia 
(Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007).
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Indonesia's politics share is the implicit or explicit suggestion that Indonesia's polity is, 
if imperfectly democratic, at least quite stable.
In this essay, I suggest that Indonesia's formal democratic institutions remain 
vulnerable to patrimonial manipulation in the context of an increasingly competitive 
and oligarchic struggle for decentralized power and governance. Through an analysis 
of recent elections in two localities, Depok and Banyuwangi, I show that the emerging 
dynamics of Indonesia's local politics contain a sometimes discordant mix of 
democratic aspirations and ongoing patrimonial influence over democratic institutions. 
In both Depok and Banyuwangi, elections and the controversies surrounding them 
ignited intense social conflict among competing local interests. In both cases, 
entrenched local elites deployed patrimonial power to stall and stymie democratic 
political processes.2 In both cases, the exercise of patrimonial politics generated 
simmering political controversies that still have lingering effects today. It may be 
reasonably argued that, given the "smooth" conduct of elections in most other 
localities, the cases of Depok and Banyuwangi are exceptions rather than the rule. In 
most other elections, entrenched elites managed to win elections, secure their control 
over local governance, and maintain their patrimonial networks without difficulty.3 
My argument is that the Depok and Banyuwangi elections reveal the potential threat of 
decentralized political competition in which entrenched elites rely on patrimonial 
power relations and mass mobilization in running political institutions and 
intimidating new power-seekers. The cases of Depok and Banyuwangi suggest that the 
coincidence of formally democratic institutions, patrimonial domination, and 
emotional mass mobilization have the potential to generate political and social 
uncertainty. At the same time, the vulnerability of Indonesia's local political 
institutions to patrimonial manipulation may not pose a serious threat to the country's 
political stability. In the end, entrenched elites in the two localities failed to secure their 
political domination and control over local governance. New leaders have shown 
some, though limited, change in their style of politics and policies. At the same time, 
these new leaders also rely on patrimonial politics in operating local institutions and 
particularly in facing the continuous challenge from entrenched elites. Left 
unaddressed, the consistent patrimonial operation of political institutions, in which 
particularistic interests dictate, will continue to contradict the image of vibrant 
democracy in Indonesia.
The terms "patrimonialism" or "patrimonial politics" in this essay refer to the 
domination of the patron-client type of linkages and the pervasiveness of personal, 
rather than universalistic, interests in the operation of political institutions. Patrimonial 
politics is mainly concerned with the capacity of power holders to maintain power and 
influence by various mechanisms, and this essay does not specifically distinguish its
2 The term "local elites" refers to locally based individuals with a disproportionate access to social, 
political, or economic power. For further discussion, see Aniruddha Dasgupta and Victoria A. Beard, 
"Community Driven Development, Collective Action, and Elite Capture in Indonesia," Development and 
Change 38,2 (2007): 229-49.
3 According to the International Crisis Group, of some 400 local elections that have taken place since 2005, 
most have proceeded without incident, and of more than 150 where the results were contested in the 
courts, most were peacefully resolved. See International Crisis Group, "Local Election Disputes in 
Indonesia: The Case of North Maluku," Asia Briefing No. 86 (Jakarta: International Crisis Group, 2009).
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modern types (known as "neo-patrimonialism') from traditional ones.4 In the case of 
Indonesia, Soekarno's Guided Democracy5 and Soeharto's Pancasila Democracy6 
regimes have been discussed as examples of the country's patrimonialism.7 Despite a 
decade of political reform since 1998, Indonesia's contemporary democracy has been 
defined by Douglas Webb as a "patrimonial democracy," in which "holders of public 
offices exploit their position primarily for personal rather than 'universalistic' ends."8 
Political competition predominantly involves mass mobilization and the distribution of 
spoils, while patrimonial norms and practices are often blamed for the country's 
pervasive and rampant corruption. In other words, the daily operation of political 
institutions in Indonesia remains patrimonial. The question is whether and how local 
elites have adjusted their patrimonial practices and behavior in accordance with 
democratic changes in the political system resulting from post-Reformasi 
decentralization policies.
The analysis is organized in three sections. In the first and second sections, I 
analyze elections in Depok and Banyuwangi in turn. I examine the election processes— 
from the nomination of candidates, to campaigns, voting, and the validation of election 
results—and the controversies that erupted. In Depok, entrenched elites led by the 
losing candidates captured the weak and corrupt legal system. In Banyuwangi, 
entrenched elites manipulated their power and sought to maintain dominance in local
4 According to Mushtag H. Khan, the key characteristic of neopatrimonialism is the personalization of 
power. Under such a circumstance, formal rules are less important than the informal networks upon 
which the leader's power is based. For further discussion, see Mushtag H. Khan, "Markets, States, and 
Democracy: Patron-Client Networks and the Case for Democracy in Developing Countries," in On the 
State o f Democracy, ed. Julio Faundez (New York, NY: Routledge, 2007); and Gero Erdmann and Ulf Engel, 
"Neopatrimonialism Revisited—Beyond a Catch-All Concept," GIGA Working Paper 16 (Hamburg: 
German Institute of Global and Area Studies, 2006). Works on patrimonialism in Indonesia's politics 
include Harold Crouch, "Patrimonialism and Military Rule in Indonesia," World Politics 31,4 (1979): 571- 
87; Schulte Nordholt, "Renegotiating Boundaries"; Douglas Webber, "A Consolidated Patrimonial 
Democracy? Democratization in Post-Suharto Indonesia," Democratization 13,3 (2006): 396-420; Syarif 
Hidayat, "'Shadow State'? Business and Politics in the Province of Banten," in Renegotiating Boundaries: 
Local Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia, pp. 203-24; and M. Isa Sulaiman and Gerry van Klinken, "The Rise 
and Fall of Governor Puteh," in Renegotiating Boundaries: Local Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia, pp. 225-52.
5 On July 5, 1959, President Soekarno issued a presidential decree that dissolved the constituent assembly 
and restored the 1945 constitution. Under Guided Democracy, party representation was partly replaced by 
functional representation in the state institutions, the parliamentary system was abolished, and the 
government became, in practice, only accountable to the president. In the absence of other institutions, 
President Soekarno and the army occupied the decision-making centers toward which all other would-be 
political actors were drawn. See Herbert Feith, "How Well Did Constitutional Democracy Function?" in 
Democracy in Indonesia: 1950s and 1990s, ed. David Bourchier and John Legge (Clayton, Victoria: Monash 
University, 1994), pp. 19-20; and R. William Liddle, Power, Participation, and the Political Parties in Indonesia 
(Cambridge, MA: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1974), p. 14.
6 Pancasila refers to five principles in the preamble of the 1945 Constitution that guided its drafting and 
were intended to guide its application. These principles were: belief in God; a just and civilized humanity; 
the unity of Indonesia; democracy led by the wisdom of deliberation among representatives; and social 
justice for all Indonesians. These principles formed the basis of New Order political discourse and 
purportedly served as a guiding force in Indonesian governance until the fall of Suharto in 1998. In 
particular, since the so-called Ormas (organisasi massa, mass organizations) Law of 1985, all special-interest 
associations in the community, including the various religious groups, were required to acknowledge 
Pancasila as their asas tunggal (sole ideological foundation). For Suharto's conceptualization of Pancasila 
Democracy, see his address delivered on August 16,1967, in David Bourchier and Vedi R. Hadiz, 
Indonesian Politics and Society: A Reader (London and New York, NY: Routledge Curzon, 2003), pp. 37—41.
7 Crouch, "Patrimonialism and Military Rule."
8 Webb, "A Consolidated Patrimonial Democracy?" p. 397.
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political institutions through accustomed networks and emotional mass mobilization. 
My analysis finds that, in both localities, local elites bypassed due political processes. 
Elite politics and the mass mobilization of supporters, made possible through 
patrimonial alliances, strongly influenced the two localities' political dynamics. 
Ultimately, in both cases, entrenched elites failed to maintain their monopoly over 
local power and governance, a development that could be taken as evidence that 
democratic mechanisms functioned effectively in each case. However, it is still unclear 
how the rise of less conventional, less entrenched elite candidates has affected the old 
patterns of local politics in which informal networks and practices play key roles. I 
argue that the cases of Depok and Banyuwangi, along with dozens of similar but less 
publicized controversies, demonstrate the vulnerability of formal democratic 
institutions to local political manipulation, particularly to local elites' patrimonial 
politics.9 Finally, I conclude by discussing the practical impact of direct local elections 
on power struggles among local elites and the changing dynamics of local politics 
more broadly.
Primary data for this analysis was collected through field visits to the two localities 
during December 2005. In both Depok and Banyuwangi, I visited party branches' 
offices, local assemblies, and local newspaper bureaus, as well as the houses of related 
individuals. I conducted in-depth interviews with the local election-commission staff, 
party politicians, local assembly members, candidates, lawyers, societal leaders, 
journalists, and academics. The secondary data was collected from national and local 
dailies, weekly or monthly magazines, and academic writings, as well as official 
documents and court records. The collected data have some limitations, which can be 
attributed to, among other things, the ambiguity of related law and regulations. No 
official institution or agency provides a full range of reliable data. Previous research 
experiences in other local elections and discussions with experienced observers were 
quite helpful in compiling the collected data.
The 2005 Depok Mayoral Election
Depok's 2005 mayoral (walikota) election was its first and preceded direct elections 
of local government heads in other strategically important cities, including Jakarta's in 
August 2007. Many people saw the city's first direct mayoral election as a litmus test of 
the impact of Indonesia's political decentralization on national as well as local power 
struggles. As we shall see below, Depok's mayoral election intensified the political 
competition among local elites, and this competition was marked by old styles of 
patrimonial manipulation. In what follows, I first discuss the Depok election in terms 
of its national significance and its local political context. I then examine the process of 
nominating the candidates, in which major parties played gatekeepers and 
controversies over the election results became highly contentious, not only in the city 
but also nationwide. I conclude the analysis by discussing how and with what effect
9 Other high-profile cases include the North Maluku gubernatorial election and the South Sulawesi 
gubernatorial election, both held in late 2007. The Supreme Court's decisions for both cases have been 
criticized as inconsistent and even contradictory. For the case of North Maluku, see International Crisis 
Group, "Local Election Disputes in Indonesia."
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the Depok elites' patrimonial politics contributed to the conflicts over the city's first 
direct mayoral election.
The Depok Election's National Significance
Depok is a city south of and adjacent to Jakarta. As such, it is part of the Jabotabek 
(Jakarta-Depok-Bogor-Tangerang-Bekasi) metro area, the tenth most populous metro 
area in the world. Depok became an administrative city in March 1982 and was 
officially designated as a "city" in 1999. The current population, in 2009, stands at 
around 1.5 million, mostly comprised of college students, office or factory workers, 
and a large, conservative Muslim constituency. Following the development and 
expansion of industry and commerce in the Jabotabek area, middle-class households 
have multiplied in Depok, adding dynamism to the local economy and politics. Many 
high-ranking national officials live in Depok. It is also home to the University of 
Indonesia. With its proximity to Jakarta and its reputation as the home of several major 
universities, Depok has become strategically significant in the country's economy and 
politics. Therefore, Depok's first direct mayoral election was nationally and even 
geopolitically important. Given the city's proximity to Jakarta, major parties could not 
underestimate the election's potential spill-over impact on national politics and Jakarta 
politics, in particular.
Additionally, the 2005 Depok mayoral election took place in a context where local 
governments were regaining their control over the decision-making process in the 
regions. Since local assemblies emerged as new loci of power in 1999, local government 
officials have adapted to the changed power configuration by rewarding local 
assembly members, financially or through other means, for their cooperation and 
collaboration. Grants of excessive perks and financial rewards for local assembly 
members have become common across the country.10 In response to the decentralized 
and increasingly prevalent money politics in the regions, national authorities began to 
bring hundreds of corrupt local officials before the courts, while they adopted a direct- 
election system for local government heads. The Depok mayoral election was one of 
such elections aimed to enhance the legitimacy and position of local government heads 
in relation to their legislative counterparts.
Depok's Local Political Context
In addition to these national concerns, there were important local issues and 
interests at stake in Depok's election. The biggest issue that dominated the election was 
corruption. In September 2004, twenty-two members of the Depok municipal assembly 
who had served during the period 1999-2004, including the chairman and two deputy 
chairmen, were prosecuted for misusing the local budget for their personal needs. In 
2002, a total of Rp.15 billion had been allocated to assembly members' operational 
activities, and Rp.9.5 billion of it was allegedly used to cover assembly members' 
personal expenses, such as for paying installments on houses, repairing cars, and
10 For a detailed analysis of the ways in which money politics was practiced by local assembly members, 
see Nankyung Choi, "Democratisation, Decentralization, and Local Party Politics in Post-Soeharto 
Indonesia" (PhD dissertation, Australian National University, 2003), Chapter IV.
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buying life insurance policies.11 By the time the local police announced its investigation 
of these twenty-two members, thirteen among them had been re-elected in the April 
2004 general elections for the period 2004-09. Depok citizens rejected those re-elected 
members, condemning them as illegitimate and untrustworthy. Despite popular 
protests and the evidence brought against them, these municipal assembly members 
refused to step down and instead held their inauguration ceremony in the local 
government building's auditorium—not in the customary assembly building—a day 
earlier than scheduled.12 In response to the hasty inauguration, hundreds of local 
people staged a rally and demanded that the newly inaugurated assembly members 
sign a declaration stating that they were morally committed to anti-corruption. 
Eighteen of forty-five members signed it, including all twelve members of the Partai 
Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS, Prosperous Justice Party) that had vigorously campaigned on 
an anti-corruption platform in 2004.13 In January 2006, seventeen assembly members 
who had served in the 1999-2004 term were sentenced to two years in jail for misusing 
Rp.7.3 billion. Among the convicted were the former chairman, Sutadi (PDI-P, Partai 
Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle), and 
the former deputy chairman and newly elected chairman for the period 2004—09, 
Naming D. Bothin (Golkar).14
Given these circumstances, many Depok assembly members did not welcome the 
presence of the PKS and, particularly, that party's strong anti-corruption rhetoric. 
Qurtifa Wijaya, chairman of the PKS fraksi15 at the municipal assembly, explained that 
when the PKS claimed the majority of seats in this governing body, there was some 
sort of "collective rejection" among the other representatives against the PKS 
members.16 He argued that, from the beginning, his party's representatives had 
difficulty in communicating with other assembly members and were isolated from 
decision-making processes. By the time the 2005 mayoral election was held, the PKS 
was unable (and unwilling) to build a coalition with other parties and decided to 
nominate its own candidates.
Corrupt Incumbent vs. "Clean Government" Advocate
The two major contestants in the mayoral election were the incumbent, backed by a 
Golkar-led coalition, and an ambitious challenger supported by the PKS. Golkar, 
Indonesia's majority party at the national level and the second biggest party in Depok, 
was especially keen to maintain and even expand its influence over the city. With the 
incumbent mayor being its loyal cadre, Golkar estimated that a victory in Depok
11 "15 Anggota DPRD Depok Jadi Tersangka," Kompas, September 11, 2004; "12 Anggota DPRD Kota 
Depok Ditahan," Kompas, September 15, 2004.
12 "Pelantikan Anggota DPRD Kota Depok Mendadak Dipercepat Sehari," Kompas, September 4, 2004.
13 "Pelantikan Anggota DPRD Depok Mendadak Maju Sehari," Tempointeraktif, September 3, 2004.
14 "Dua Tahun Penjara untuk 17 Mantan Anggota DPRD Depok," Pikiran Rakyat, January 25, 2006.
15 A party fraksi refers to a cluster of members either from a single big party or a coalition of small parties 
in the local assembly. Although/raksi is not part of the assembly's official structure, it plays a crucial role 
in the day-to-day politics of local assemblies, engaging in important tasks that range from selecting the 
assembly leadership to determining the membership of different commissions and committees.
16 Interview with Qurtifa Wijaya, chairman of the PKS fraksi at the Depok Municipal Assembly, Depok, 
December 12, 2005.
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would help the party's gubernatorial candidates in Jakarta and beyond. For the PKS, in 
the meantime, the Depok mayoral race was a crucial strategic test. Having won the 
2004 general elections in Depok and Jakarta, the PKS party members viewed the 2005 
mayoral election as an opportunity to consolidate its influence over the Jabotabek 
metro area and use the resulting momentum to launch its efforts at nationwide 
expansion.
Table 1: Party Composition in the Depok Municipal Assembly (2004-2009)
Political Parties Number of Seats Percentage of Total
PKS 12 27
Golkar 8 18
PD 8 18
PDI-P 5 11
PAN 5 11
PPP 4 9
PKB 2 4
PDS 1 2
Total 45 100
The process of nominating candidates for Depok's mayoral election resembled that 
of other regional elections: dominant political parties functioned as gatekeepers in 
selecting candidates. Under Law No. 32 of 2004, only political parties, or party 
coalitions, with 15 percent or more of assembly seats, or having received 15 percent or 
more of the vote in the general election, are eligible to nominate candidates in direct 
local elections.17Thus, Depok's 2004 general election outcomes allowed only the PKS, 
Golkar, and the Partai Demokrat (PD, Democrat Party) to nominate mayoral 
candidates on their own. Five other parties controlled the remaining seats, which 
amounted to a third of the assembly.
After several months of intense negotiations, two parties and three coalitions 
nominated five pairs of candidates (see Table 2, below).18 The PKS and the PD each 
nominated its own candidates, while Golkar built a coalition with the PKB (Partai 
Kebangkitan Bangsa, National Awakening Party). The other parties formed two other 
coalitions: the PDI-P formed a coalition with the Islamic-oriented Partai Pembangunan 
Persatuan (PPP, United Development Party) and the Christian-based Partai Damai
17 For a detailed discussion about the background and process of electoral reform for local government 
heads since 1999, see Choi "Local Elections and Democracy," pp. 330-32. For an analysis of the 
institutional framework of direct local elections, along with controversies over the new electoral system, 
see Nankyung Choi, "Indonesia's Direct Local Elections: Background and Institutional Framework," 
Working Paper 137 (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological 
University, 2007).
18 As I have emphasized, one of the notable features of direct local elections is the profoundly inconsistent 
patterns of party coalitions across the country. For further discussion, see Choi, "Local Elections and
Democracy," p. 340.
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Sejahtera (PDS, Prosperous Peace Party), while the Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN, 
National Mandate Party) formed a coalition with four small parties—the Partai Bulan 
Bintang (PBB, Crescent Star Party), the Partai Bintang Reformasi (PBR, Reform Star 
Party), the Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa (PKPB, Concern for the Nation Functional 
Party), and the Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia (PKPI, Indonesian Justice and 
Unity Party).
Table 2: Candidates and Supporting Parties in Depok's 2005 Mayoral Election
Candidates Supporting Parties Number of Seats (Percentage)
Nurmahmudi Ismail & 
Yuyun Wirasaputra PKS 12 (26.7 %)
Badrul Kamal & 
Syihabuddin Ahmad Golkar and PKB 10 (22.2 %)
Yus Rusyandi & 
Soetadi Dipowongso PDI-P, PPP, and PDS 10 (22.2 %)
Abdul Wahab Abidin & 
Ilham Wijaya PD 8 (17.8 %)
Harun Heryana & 
Farkhan A. R.
PAN, PBB, PBR, 
PKPB, and PKPI
5 (11.1% but received 17.7% of 
vote in 2004 general elections)
Although there were five pairs of candidates, the election quickly became a race 
between candidates backed by the PKS and the Golkar-led coalition. Golkar was the 
established power in Depok and had effectively controlled the mayorship since 1999. 
The Golkar-led coalition backed Badrul Kamal, the incumbent mayor (1999-2004) and 
an in-law of West Java Governor Danny Setiawan. Given that Badrul Kamal had been 
elected by members of the municipal assembly, the direct election was a test of his 
legitimacy and accountability. When the election took place, however, Badrul Kamal 
was under investigation by the Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi 
Pemberantasan Korupsi, KPK) in relation to the corruption case mentioned earlier. 
Along with seventeen members of the municipal assembly, he was charged with 
misusing Rp.9.5 billion from the city's 2002 budget. He was ultimately not convicted 
but still suffered from this blow to his legitimacy and the public's impression that he 
had been guilty of corruption. He sought support from diverse political and economic 
local elites, particularly from those used to his patrimonial style of governance and 
interested in sustaining the existing executive-legislative power relations.19
The city's power relations in June 2005 were quite different from those of the 
previous period. Through the 2004 general elections, the PKS and the PD emerged as
19 Interview with Mukhlisin, journalist of Otonomi, a Depok-based monthly magazine, Depok, December 
12, 2005.
Democracy and Patrimonial Politics in Local Indonesia 139
strong competitors against major parties like Golkar. While the PD was effectively just 
an electoral vehicle for Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's presidential ambition, the PKS 
was a more substantive political party, with a platform and ambitions for using Depok 
as a launching pad to contest Jakarta's 2007 mayoral election and the 2009 national 
elections. In fact, in its ambition to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with other major parties 
like Golkar, the party had moderated its staunch Islamic principles and, to compensate 
for that adaptation, had amplified its fight against corruption and poverty. To boost its 
chances in Depok, the PKS nominated a high-profile young candidate: Nurmahmudi 
Ismail, the former minister of Forestry and Plantations (1999-2000), educated in the 
United States. 20 Younger and comparatively professional leaders, such as 
Nurmahmudi Ismail, were regarded as crucial in convincing the people of the party's 
more moderate and progressive image.21 Unfortunately, although he was to campaign 
on an anti-corruption theme, Nurmahmudi was himself involved in an environmental 
case, for during his term as the minister of Forestry and Plantations, he had been 
accused of having issued a permit for a company to develop plantations in East 
Kalimantan that eventually brought about severe forest degradation on the island. He 
was later acquitted.
"Correcting" the Election Results
The Depok mayoral election proceeded relatively smoothly and peacefully. Over 61 
percent of registered voters cast their votes on June 26, 2005. However, the election 
results quickly became controversial as, even before they were announced, Badrul's 
supporters began staging demonstrations protesting the results of "quick counting." 
On June 28, a group of Badrul's supporters sat in the office of the Depok branch of the 
Election Commission (Komisi Pemiihan Umum Depok, KPUD Depok) and demanded 
vote counting be suspended.22 On July 6, the KPUD Depok announced the election 
results, declaring that Nurmahmudi and his deputy mayoral candidate had won the 
contest with 43 percent of the valid votes. Five official witnesses who watched the polls 
endorsed the KPUD Depok's authorization.23
Badrul and his supporters did not relent. Right after the election results were 
announced, Badrul filed his complaint with the West Java High Court concerning the 
registration of eligible voters at the KPUD Depok.24 At a court hearing held on July 21, 
the Badrul camp advanced two arguments. First, they accused the KPUD Depok of 
committing fraud in the process of voter registration, and asserted that the KPUD's 
deliberate disenfranchisement of a number of citizens had resulted in deflating
20 Nurmahmudi Ismail was one of the leaders of the Justice Party (Partai Keadilan, PK), which was 
strongly Islam-oriented and derived support mostly from middle-class Islamic study groups and student 
organizations. The party obtained 1.4 percent of the vote in the 1999 general elections, failing to pass the 
electoral threshold of 2 percent. To participate in the 2004 general elections, the party changed its name to 
PKS and also changed its platform, which now focuses on anti-corruption, anti-poverty, and good 
governance campaigns. See "Populist Spirit of a Propagation Party," Tempo 31 /IX, March 31-April 6, 2009.
21 "Indonesia's Muslim Party Widens its Appeal," International Herald Tribune, March 21, 2006.
22 "Penghitungan Suara Pilkada Depok Kisruh: Meski Dijaga Polisi, Penghitungan Terpaksa Dihentikan," 
Kompas, June 29, 2005; and "Nur Mahmudi Unggul, Massa Badrul Demo," Pikiran Rakyat, June 29, 2005.
23 "Pilkada: Nurmahmudi Ismail Wali Kota Depok Terpilih," Kompas, July 7, 2005.
24 "Pilkada Depok: Badrul Ajukan Keberatan," Kompas, July 13, 2005.
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0digembosi) the tally of their candidate's support. In other words, they argued that they 
lost because their unregistered supporters had not been allowed to cast ballots. Second, 
they claimed that Nurmahmudi's vote was inflated (digelembungkan) because the 
KPUD Depok had allowed non-Depok residents to vote.25 The court heard the 
testimony from eleven witnesses chosen by Badrul's lawyers and one witness 
representing the KPUD Depok. Spokespersons for Nurmahmudi's side were not 
invited to the hearing. They were not alone in believing that Badrul's argument had no 
legal or factual basis.
Table 3: Election Results of Depok's Election Commission 
and the West Java High Court
Pair of Candidates Number of Votes Obtained in Polls
Number of Votes after the Ruling by 
the West Java High Court
Nurmahmudi Ismail 
& Yuyun 
Wirasaputra
232,610 204, 828 (after deducting 27,782)
Badrul Kamal & 
Syihabuddin Ahmad 206,781 269,551 (after adding 62,770)
Yus Rusyandi & 
Sutadi Dipowongso 34,096 No change
Abdul Wahab/ 
Ilham Wijaya 32,461 No change
Harun Heryana & 
Far khan A. R. 23,859 No change
Total 529,807 564,795
Source: Depok's Election Commission (KPUD Depok)
In fact, in legal terms, the Depok case had at least two flaws. First, according to the 
law, the court hearing had to be held within fourteen days after the court accepted the 
complaint, but this court's decision was three days late.26 Second, the law limits the 
aspects of an election that can be legally considered and challenged; only irregularities 
in the tallying of votes constitute a legitimate legal issue, which means the court should
25 Interview with Ali Nurdin, one of Nurmahmudi Ismail's lawyers, Jakarta, December 10, 2005; and 
interview with Zulfadli, chairman of the Depok Municipal Election Commission (KPUD Depok), Depok, 
December 12, 2005.
26 Article 106, verse (4), of Law No. 32 of 2004: The West Java High Court accepted the complaint on July 
12 and, thus, it had to announce its verdict by July 26, 2005. If the verse is understood to refer to fourteen 
"working" days, the court had to announce its verdict by August 1, at the latest. The decision was 
announced on August 4. See "Lima Alasan PKS Tolak Pembatalan Kemenangan Nur Mahmudi," 
Tempointeraktif, August 5, 2005; Denny Indrayana, "Putusan Pilkada Depok Batal Demi Keadilan," 
Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia, Jakarta, August 9, 2005; Refly Harun, "Kolom: Kemelut 
Pemilihan Walikota Depok," Tempointeraktif, August 8, 2005; Center for Electoral Reform, "Pernyataan 
Pers: Nasib Demokrasi Kita Ada Di Tangan Mahkamah Agung," Jakarta, August 19, 2005; and Amir 
Syamsuddin, "Kisruh Pilkada Kota Depok Berlanjut," Kompas, September 5, 2005.
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not have taken into account votes that had not even been cast.27 Unexpectedly, 
however, the chief judge of the West Java High Court had a different view. On August 
4, the High Court decided to accept Badrul's argument that his supporters had been 
unable to cast their votes because they were not registered and thus the election results 
had "undercounted" the actual votes that he could otherwise have received. The court 
annulled the election results on the ground that the results were tarnished by rampant 
vote rigging, which in turn led to the "over-counting" of votes won by the 
Nurmahmudi-Yuyun's partnership (see Table 3, above).28 As one critical observer put 
it, "the judges effectively registered the voters and punched the ballots—all on 
Badrul's behalf."29
Nurmahmudi's party supporters were shocked by the court's ruling, but they 
could not respond directly to the court's decision because the case was set up as a 
dispute between the Badrul-Syihabuddin pair and the KPUD Depok. The other three 
pairs of candidates immediately rejected the High Court's decision because, according 
to the chairman of the KPUD Depok, "they knew who had won the election."30 The 
only option the Nurmahmudi-Yuyun pair had was to assist the KPUD Depok in 
seeking legal advice.31 But they also had to find a way of engaging themselves in the 
case, which had nullified their apparent victory. Following the decision, Depok society 
descended into social turmoil marked by incessant mass rallies, divided communities, 
politicized bureaucrats, and stalled governance, turmoil that lasted for the next six 
months.32
In attempting to explain controversies over election results such as Depok's, many 
commentators have directed their attention to the alleged missteps demonstrating the 
incompetence of the KPUD, the institutions governing elections of local government 
heads. In fact, these commissions have proven to be a weak link in Indonesia's direct 
local elections; their troubles commonly stem from their members' limited experience, 
dependence on external resources, and weak authority. Organizing and staging an 
election for the first time without national coordination and direction is a formidable 
task. Moreover, each KPUD has to do so with a limited and inexperienced staff whose 
members, in turn, have to rely on a dozen administrative staff persons dispatched by 
the local government. As in Depok, updating the list of registered voters is one of the 
most difficult tasks many KPUD confront, and it usually leads to charges against them 
for incompetence or logistical failures.33
27 Center for Electoral Reform, "Pernyataan Pers."
28 Yuli Tri Suwarni and Abdul Khalik, "Court Overturns PKS Depok Win," The Jakarta Post, August 5, 2005.
29 Kanis Dursin, "The Easy Way to Win an Election," The Jakarta Post, August 25, 2005. See also Mahdi 
Muhammad, "Pilkada Depok Dianulir, PKS: Putusan Pengadilan Tinggi Jawa Barat Dagelan," Kompas, 
August 5, 2005; and Saldi Isra, "Kepala Daerah Pilihan Hakim," Kompas, August 9, 2005.
30 Interview with Zulfadli, December 12, 2005.
31 Interview with Ali Nurdin, December 10, 2005.
32 Observing the unyielding candidates, their supporters' incessant rallies, and increasingly polarized local 
communities, a journalist described the Depok case as "one of the most eye-catching phenomena" and 
said it deserved "to be noted in the history of the 2005 direct local executive elections." See Sidik Pramono, 
"Kisruh Pilkada: Ge(r)geran Wali Kota Depok," Kompas, January 3, 2006.
33 To update the list of registered voters, each KPUD usually starts by obtaining the data used in the 
previous election from the Civil Registry Office (Dinas Kependudukan dan Catatan Sipil) of the respective 
local government. The KPUD then verifies the primary data and encourages eligible but unregistered
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While the KPUD do indeed represent an outstanding problem in Indonesia's 
electoral system, these commissions have also become convenient scapegoats for those 
complaining about problems whose roots lie elsewhere. No matter where ultimate 
responsibility may lie, and frequently in the absence of any evidence, losing candidates 
now tend to routinely blame the KPUD for being partial or incompetent or both. While 
the KPUD's problems are important, most electoral disputes have been motivated by 
heightened competition among local elites over local power and governance, rather 
than the KPUD's deliberate or unintended maneuvering. The case of Depok 
exemplifies this sort of misplaced blame, and it became controversial nationally 
because the West Java High Court, particularly its chief justice, made a bizarre 
decision. It was the first and, so far, the last case in which the judiciary overturned 
post-New Order local election results in Indonesia. Judiciaries of other regions have 
dealt with similar complaints in different ways.34 The root of the conflict in Depok was 
not the dispute over the fairness of the election results, but the capture of the local 
judiciary by entrenched power.
Conflict Management
No matter how controversial it proved to be, the West Java High Court's verdict 
was "final and binding," in accordance with the governing system of direct local 
elections, as outlined in Law No. 32 of 2004. To the PKS and its supporters, the decision 
was entirely illegitimate and unacceptable.35 They were not alone in their outrage. The 
reversal of the election results by the court in the absence of evidence exposed the 
weakness and inconsistency of electoral rules and undermined the public's trust in 
democratic political institutions more generally.36 To overturn the High Court's 
"binding and final" decision, the PKS placed pressure on the KPUD Depok, which, in 
turn, brought the case before the Supreme Court. Although the Supreme Court was
voters to register with the Subdistrict Election Committee (Panitia Pemilu Kecamatan, PPK), which has 
representatives at the village level. At a minimum, six months' residence in the subdistrict is required for a 
person to register as an eligible voter. Almost all the KPUD have faced two basic problems in updating the 
list of eligible voters: first, the quality of the updated list of registered voters heavily depends on the 
primary data provided by the Civil Registry Office, which operates under the authority of each respective 
local government. Many KPUD officials often argue that they do not have enough staff and resources to 
revise and update the data. Second, the level of voluntary registration tends to be quite low, since 
entrenched political parties and local assembly members offer very little support for new-voter 
registration. Voters themselves often appear indifferent to direct local elections and fail to make sure that 
they are registered for them. See Choi, "Indonesia's Direct Local Elections"; "Konflik KPUD-Kepala 
Daerah Sudah Dapat Diramalkan," Kompas, April 8, 2005; and Lukita Grahadyarini, "Pilkada dan 
Kelemahan Administrasi," Kompas, November 5, 2005.
34 For example, the Banten High Court rejected similar complaints brought by the PKS with regard to the 
results of Banten's November 2006 gubernatorial election. See Michael Buehler, "The Direct Elections of 
Regents and Governors in Post-New Order Indonesia: Oligarchic Restructuring of Democratization?" 
paper prepared for delivery at the 2008 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association,
Boston, MA, August 28-31, 2008.
35 "Thousands of PKS Supporters Stage Rally in Jakarta," The Jakarta Post, August 8, 2005.
36 Former Minister for Regional Autonomy Ryaas Rasyid related that "the controversy over the [Depok] 
case has made things awkward for the government." See A. Manan, R. Kustini, Olivia, and Nuraini, "A 
Fight to the Bitter end in Depok," Tempo 1 9 /VI, January 10-16, 2006.
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initially reluctant to hear the case, it finally did so, and the results further polarized 
Depok's political elites and their supporters.37
On August 5, the PKS supporters staged a protest in front of the West Java High 
Court in Bandung, while hundreds of local people, organized by the Joint Forum for 
the Depok Community (Forum Bersama Masyarakat Depok, FBMD), held another rally 
in front of the Depok City Hall.38 National leaders of the two parties also took up the 
battle to support their cadres' bid for local power and governance. Jusuf Kalla, 
Indonesia's vice president and Golkar's chairman, asked all the parties to accept the 
court verdict, while Hidayat Nur Wahid, the PKS's former president and the chairman 
of the People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR), 
urged the Supreme Court to abrogate its delegation of mandate to the West Java High 
Court, which he denounced as unprofessional.39 The PKS quickly made several 
additional strategic maneuvers. The party assailed the case, treating it as a litmus test 
of Indonesia's new electoral democracy. As the party's chairman of the Election 
Victory Board, M. Razikun, argued, the Depok case demonstrated how the country's 
new democracy was being threatened and damaged by "justice mafia" (mafia 
peradilan).40 The party registered its complaints regarding the West Java High Court's 
decision at the Judicial Commission (Komisi Yudisial, KY) and also reported to the 
police that two election supervisory committee officials had given false testimony at 
the court hearing.41
The KPUD Depok held a plenary session on August 6, one day after the protest by 
the PKS supporters, and decided to challenge the West Java High Court's decision. 
From the KPUD Depok's standpoint, the court's decision to overturn the election 
results was a result of political maneuvering by certain groups of local elites. Given its 
limited resources, the KPUD Depok needed legal assistance to pursue its challenge, 
and that assistance came from both the provincial KPUD and the PKS.42 On August 16, 
the KPUD Depok appealed to the Supreme Court to review the West Java High Court's 
decision.43 Following the KPUD Depok's move, the supporters of Badrul, on the one 
hand, and the PKS, on the other, staged pro- and anti-KPUD Depok rallies, 
respectively.44 Diverse nongovernmental organizations, including the Center for 
Electoral Reform, urged the Supreme Court to make a decision as soon as possible in 
order to keep the masses from being carried away by emotional reactions. The chief 
judge of the Supreme Court, Bagir Manan, was initially reluctant to get involved in the
37 Initially, the Supreme Court judged the West Java High Court's decision to be legally correct. See "MA 
Nyatakan Putusan Pengadilan Tinggi Jabar Sah," Antara, August 8, 2005; and "Putusan PT Final dan 
Mengikat: Depdagri Tidaklkut Campur Tangan," Kornpas, August 11, 2005.
38 "Forum Masyarakat Depok Unjuk Rasa Tolak Putusan PT Jawa Barat," Tempointeraktif, August 6, 2005.
39 "Kader PKS Unjuk Rasa, Partai Golkar Minta Putusan Pengadilan Dihormati," Kompas, August 6, 2005; 
Bambang Dwi Djanuarto, "PKS: Gelar perkara Pilkada Depok" and "Menunggu serangan balik 
Nurmahmudi," Bisnis Indonesia, August 10, 2005.
40 Interview with M. Razikun, chairman of the PKS's Election Victory Board, Jakarta, December 12, 2005.
41 "PKS Reports Poll Officials for Deception," The Jakarta Post, August 12, 2005.
42 Interview with Zulfadli, December 12, 2005.
43 KPU, "KPUD Depok Resmi Ajukan PK Ke MA Sebagai Upaya Hukum Luar Biasa," August 19, 2005, at 
http: / / www.kpu.go.id, last accessed September 6, 2005.
44 "Giliran Penentang KPUD Depok Unjuk Rasa," Tempointeraktif, August 25, 2005; and "Demo Dukung 
Upaya Hukum KPUD Depok," Tempointeraktif, August 25, 2005.
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case. When the controversy was reported in the media, he immediately stated that the 
Depok case could not be appealed to the Supreme Court because the West Java High 
Court's decision was "final and binding." Prominent lawyer Adnan Buyung Nastion 
criticized Bagir Manan for unwisely commenting on the Depok case. Given that he was 
going to deal with the case, the judge was not supposed to comment on it prematurely. 
Adnan Buyung Nastion decided to help advise Nurmahmudi's lawyers because, as he 
explained, "the High Court only implements the Supreme Court's authority because it 
is delegated. If the delegation of authority is misused or used incorrectly, of course the 
Supreme Court is authorized to re-examine it."45
An investigation team of the Supreme Court evaluated the evidence and concluded 
that the five judges of the West Java High Court had exceeded the limits of the court's 
authority.46 This finding did not mean that the decision itself was reversed, however. 
Judge Paulus E. Lotulung, the team's leader, only recommended the Supreme Court 
impose sanctions against the five judges.47 On September 15, the Judicial Commission 
also concluded that the West Java High Court's judges had acted unprofessionally and 
recommended that chief judge Nana Juwana be suspended for a year and the other 
four judges be given written reprimands.48 However, months passed before the 
Supreme Court decided to oversee the five judges and prohibited them from dealing 
with lawsuits for one or two years.
Despite continuous mass rallies and the growing public concern about the vacuum 
of governance, it took almost three months for the Supreme Court to take action on the 
controversy.49 While the case was waiting to be addressed by the court, the internal 
conflicts within the municipal government and the municipal assembly, as well as 
tension among citizens, were exacerbated.50 On December 16, the Court decided to 
accept the KPUD Depok's request for a judicial review and annulled the West Java
45 Manan et. al., "A Fight to the Bitter End in Depok." In fact, Ali Nurdin, Nurmahmudi's lawyer, was one 
of Adnan Buyung Nastion's assistants. Interview with Ali Nurdin, December 10, 2005.
46 Even Golkar's cadres seemed startled by the regional court's decision. They then tried to redirect the 
controversy to focus on the poor judgment of the judges, rather than their decision per se. For example, 
Babay Suhami, Golkar representative at the Depok Municipal Assembly, argued that "if a judge made a 
mistake, the judge should be investigated, not the decision." See L. R. Baskoro, M. Kusuma, and A. 
Manan, "Perlawanan Bulan Sabit," Tempo 26/ XXXIV, August 22-28, 2005.
47 Komisi Pemilihan Umum (KPU), "Tim Panel MA Nilai Majelis Flakim PT Jabar Lakukan 
'Unprofessional Conduct,"' August 26, 2005 (downloaded from http: / / www.kpu.go.id on September 6, 
2005).
48 The Judicial Commission, which had just been established about a week before the case was lodged, 
found that the West Java Fhgh Court's judges violated the "code of conduct," and were unprofessional 
because they did not consider the keystone issues of fairness, impartiality, and equal opportunity. See 
"Komisi Yudisial Minta Flakim Kasus Depok Diberhentikan," Tempointeraktif, September 16, 2005; and 
"Sengketa Pilkada Depok: Ketua PT Jawa Barat "Diberhentikan" 1 Tahun," Kompas, September 16, 2005. 
The commission recommended that the Justice Board (Majelis Flakim Agung) give Chief Justice Nana 
Juwana one year's suspension and serve the four other judges with letters of reprimand. However, the 
Supreme Court decided not to respond immediately to the Judicial Commission's recommendations, but 
instead to focus on its own judicial review. After more than a month, the Judicial Commission urged the 
Supreme Court again to follow up on its recommendations concerning the West Java High Court judges. 
See "Komisi Yudisial Minta MA Laksanakan Rekomendasi Mereka," Tempointeraktif, October 24, 2005.
49 "Supreme Court Delays Judicial Commission's Recommendation," The Jakarta Post, September 25, 2005; 
"Hubungan antar Lembaga: Komisi Yudisial Berharap MA Responsif," Kompas, September 29, 2005; and 
"Kepastian Politik Sangat Dinantikan: Pembangunan Fisik Tertunda," Kompas, October 20, 2005.
50 Interview with Mukhlisin, December 12, 2005.
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High Court's decision "because the High Court's judges exceeded [their] authority and 
the limits of the law."51
Old Tricks, Old Politics
By the time the Supreme Court announced its decision, the controversy had 
already spilled over into other arenas of Depok society, heightening tensions among 
different segments of local society. Depok's political atmosphere became highly 
polarized, particularly when some subdistrict heads (camat) and village heads sided 
with Badrul and refused to accept Nurmahmudi's victory. On December 19, 
representatives of four parties that had supported the Badrul-Syihabuddin pair (i.e., 
Golkar, PAN, PPP, and PKB) submitted a written rejection of the Supreme Court's 
decision to the Department of Home Affairs. The PD also criticized the Supreme Court 
for its inconsistency.52 The next day, grassroots supporters, divided into Badrul's and 
Nurmahmudi's groups, clashed at the Cibinong Court, where a corruption case against 
seventeen Depok municipal assembly members (1999-2004) was being held. The two 
groups encountered each other again in front of the Depok City Hall later the same 
day.53
On December 30, forty-two out of sixty-three village heads in Depok sent a 
statement rejecting the Supreme Court's decision to President Yudhoyono and a 
number of state institutions, including the national assembly (Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat, DPR) and the Minister of Home Affairs.54 Surprised by such an unusual move 
by low-level civil servants, the Public Servant Corps (Korps Pegawai Republik 
Indonesia, Korpri) warned that it would sanction the forty-two village heads because 
they should have maintained their impartiality in such a case.55 However, as it later 
turned out, the letter was a result of some kind of political maneuvering on Badrul's 
side. A Kompas report disclosed that some of the village heads had thought they were 
simply signing a guest list when they visited Badrul's house on December 28, and that 
this list of signatures was later attached to the statement rejecting the Supreme Court's 
decision without their consent.56 Badrul Kamal acknowledged that he had met with 
village heads, but denied that he had tricked them in this way. However, then some 
village heads argued that they had not even attended the meeting at Badrul's house.57 
Seven village heads issued a letter of protest, arguing that they were not informed 
about the statement rejecting the Supreme Court's decision and that they would not 
have signed the list if they had been informed of such an intention beforehand. They 
sent the letter to the president and other state institutions.58
51 "Sengketa Pilkada: MA 'Menangkan' Nur Mahmudi-Yuyun," Kompas, December 17, 2005; and Manan et 
al., "A fight to the bitter end in Depok."
52 "Empat Partai Hadang Nurmahmudi Ismail," Tempointeraktif, December 19, 2005.
53 "Bentrok di Cibinong Berlanjut di Balaikota Depok," Tempointeraktif, December 20, 2005.
54 "42 Lurah Depok Tolak Putusan MA," Tempointeraktif, January 3, 2006.
55 "Korpri Akan Peringatkan 42 Lurah Depok," Tempointeraktif, January 4, 2006.
56 "Manuver Politik ala Pak Lurah," Kompas, January 5, 2006.
57 "Mendagri Tunggu Depok: Realitas Politik Pilkada Dipertimbangkan," Kompas, January 5, 2006.
58 "Tujuh Lurah Depok Sanggah Tolak Nurmahmudi," Antara, January 8, 2006.
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On January 2, 2006, members of the Depok Municipal Assembly finally agreed to 
take action. They sent to West Java's governor both a request that Nurmahmudi be 
inaugurated and a protest letter from Badrul's lawyers.59 Still, both Governor Denny 
Setiawan and secretary general of the Department of Home Affairs Progo Nurdjaman 
were reluctant to take the responsibility of making a final decision.60 Meanwhile, 
Badrul's side tried to overturn the Supreme Court's decision. On January 4, Badrul's 
attorney presented an appeal to the Constitutional Court arguing that the Supreme 
Court's decision had violated Law No. 32 of 2004.61 He argued that the law states 
election disputes at the district/municipal level should be handled by regional high 
courts and that their decisions are "final and binding." However, the next day 
Governor Denny Setiawan finally requested the Minister of Home Affairs to approve 
the inauguration of Nurmahmudi Ismail and Yuyun Wirasaputra. The Ministry of 
Home Affairs was still hesitant to make its final decision, while Badrul's supporters 
continued to stage protests against the inauguration plan. 62 On January 25, the 
Constitutional Court officially rejected the petition submitted by Badrul's allies. The 
following day, Nurmahmudi Ismail and Yuyun Sirasaputra were finally sworn in as 
the first directly elected Depok mayor and deputy mayor.63
The conflicts over the Depok mayoral election were triggered by a flawed legal 
decision made by the West Java High Court, but the case also illustrates the impact of 
Indonesia's ongoing political and administrative decentralization on its local politics: 
increasingly intense power struggles are taking place between competing political and 
economic elites in the country's regions. Nationally, Depok's election was seen as 
critical to the Jakarta gubernatorial election and the general elections in the following 
years. In Depok, the election was about Badrul Kamal's administration, which seemed 
to have nurtured corrupt and paternalistic relationships with assembly members and 
bureaucrats. The election results were thus seen as reflecting the local population's 
longing for cleaner and more accountable governance. As one of the few high-profile 
cases of local election disputes, the Depok mayoral election shows that Indonesia's 
local power struggle is now much more intense than ever. Indonesia's local power 
contestation has also become oligarchic, as entrenched and well-financed elites have 
dominated the electoral stage across the country.
In addition, the response of Depok's local elites to the conflict shows that the 
intensified local power struggle has been accompanied by old-fashioned elite political 
maneuvering, rather than ideal democratic processes, such as expanded popular 
participation and the strengthening of civil society. Elite politics and the politics of 
mobilizing the masses through patrimonial networks played significant roles in 
deciding Depok's political dynamics. Two rival elite groups not only tried to take 
advantage of their national connections in their bid for local power, but also relied
59 "Pilkada Depok: DPRD Serahkan Soal Depok Kepada Mendagri," Kompas, January 3, 2006.
60 "Saling Lempar Masalah Depok: Partai Golkar Tawarkan Konsensus sebagai Solusi," Kompas, January 4, 
2006.
61 "Pengacara Badrul Kamal Minta Mendagri Tunda Pelantikan Walikota Baru," Tempointeraktif, January 
10, 2006.
62 "Perlawanan Pendukung Badrul Kamal, Macetkan Depok," Tempointeraktif, January 12, 2006.
63 "Upaya Badrul Kandas: Pagi ini Nur Mahmudi Dilantik Jadi Wali Kota Depok," Kompas, January 26, 
2006; and "Court Refuses to Get Involved in Depok Election Dispute," The Jakarta Post, January 26, 2006.
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heavily on top-down mass mobilization to show their political muscle. They asked 
national agencies, such as the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Supreme Court, to 
intervene in the case because of the ambiguity of the related law and regulations. At 
the same time, they exercised informal patrimonial politics in their attempts to justify 
and defend their positions, an effort reflected in the relentless mass rallies, the 
engagement of highly politicized bureaucrats, and growing tension among different 
communal groups. Eventually, the original election results were proved to be 
legitimate and the original winning candidates were allowed to claim their victory. 
Nonetheless, the informal and personal politics that Depok's local elites depended on 
in their bid for power exemplify the persistent influence of patrimonial elite politics in 
Indonesia's heated struggle over local power and governance.
The 2005 Banyuwangi Regent's Election
Banyuwangi is a district located on the Bali Strait, at the easternmost end of Java 
Island. Its economy is based largely on agriculture and small-scale trade. Although 
Banyuwangi has a good-sized port, its economy is small and a large number of its 
people live in poverty. A distinctive feature of Banyuwangi is its ethnic diversity. Its 
population includes the indigenous Osing people, the descendants of Majapahit's 
nobles and literati who refused to convert to Islam in the sixteenth century and fled to 
this region. The Osing retain distinctive linguistic and religious practices and a strong 
ethnic identity, despite (or perhaps because of) their increasing social interaction with 
other ethnic groups that have migrated to the region over time.64 These include 
Javanese, Madurese, and Balinese. Such an ethnic composition seems to have figured 
in Banyuwangi's politics, if not always prominently and straightforwardly.
Under the Soeharto regime and since its fall, local politics in Banyuwangi has 
developed into a competitive patrimonial system animated by continuous infighting 
within different elite groups and sporadic violence among them. Banyuwangi's elites 
have managed the district through patrimonial governing strategies and state-society 
relations. Local leaders, whether politicians, bureaucrats, Islamic clerics, or black-magic 
practitioners, have always held special positions in their relationships with the local 
people.65 As in many other local societies in rural Indonesia, they have efficiently used 
their patrimonial networks to reduce tension among different ethnic and religious 
groups. Throughout the twentieth century and until very recently, however,
64 Mostly concentrated in East Java and Banyuwangi District in particular, the Osing speak their own 
dialect (a dialect of Javanese) and have relatively successfully kept their Hindu traditions, although they 
have increasingly converted to Islam and integrated with other cultures into their own. Banyuwangi is 
also known as one of the most powerful centers of black magic in Indonesia. In the late 1990s, the remote 
district drew serious attention from domestic and international journalists and scholars because of a series 
of mysterious murders of black-magic practitioners and local Islamic clerics during 1998. Regarding the 
Osing's culture and religion, see Andrew Beatty, Varieties o f Javanese Religion: An Anthropological Account 
(Cambridge and New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 11-12 and 18-20. For analysis of 
black magic and these mysterious murders, see Jason Brown, "The Banyuwangi Murders," Inside Indonesia 
62 (2000); and Sunarlan, "Kekerasan Negara dan Konflik Elite (Studi Kasus di Banyuwangi 1998-1999)," 
Jurnal Demokrasi & HAM 2,1 (2002): 110-36.
65 Sunarlan, "Kekerasan Negara dan Konflik Elite"; Sunarlan, "Rezim Patrimonial di Tingkat Lokal Pasca- 
Reformasi: Studi Kasus Kabupaten Banyuwangi," in Pendekatan Kebudayaan dalam Pembangunan Jawa 
Timur, ed. Ayu Sutarto and Setya Yuwana Ducikan (Jember: Kelompok Peduli Budaya dan Wisata Daerah 
Jawa Timur, 2004), pp. 147-80.
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Banyuwangi people have been frequently involved in violent incidents. Although this 
violence is hard to attribute to any single factor, some observers have suggested that 
local elites' patrimonial roles have contributed to such incidents.66 A decade of political 
reform and socio-cultural change has localized political processes, but politics in 
Banyuwangi has remained, by and large, an elite business. As an expert of 
Banyuwangi politics argues, the district's elites seem to have even expanded their 
domination with the help, ironically, of the democratic reforms and decentralization 
introduced since 1998.67 Taking advantage of the substantially expanded powers and 
resources given to district governments, those who have traditionally controlled the 
district's post-Suharto politics and governance have renewed, modified, and, in some 
cases, extended the patrimonial system.
Therefore, Banyuwangi's 2005 regent's (bupati) election was a high-stakes contest. 
The election became nationally controversial after the results were announced. As 
happened in Depok, losing candidates attempted to nullify the election results, but 
unlike in Depok, the electoral dispute in Banyuwangi soon spilled over into other 
sensitive areas, such as religion and culture, provoking widespread social upheavals. 
That Banyuwangi's religious leaders have become more influential over, and 
sometimes directly involved in, local political processes made the case even more 
complex. Overall, Banyuwangi's first direct regent's election shows how political 
decentralization in Indonesia, though it has provided local elites opportunities to vie 
for local power, has been inadequate to ensure a convincingly democratic political 
process.
In what follows, I discuss the impact of political parties' gatekeeping role on the 
selection of candidates in Banyuwangi's 2005 regent election, focusing particularly on 
how the internal fragmentation of major parties shaped the electoral field. I then 
examine the attempts by the incumbent regent and other entrenched elites to intervene 
in the electoral process and ultimately maintain their hold on power. Finally, I analyze 
the conflicts over the unexpected election results that swept the district's political and 
social life for the following four months. I conclude the analysis by discussing how and 
with what effect Banyuwangi elites' patrimonial politics contributed to the conflicts 
over the district's first direct regent election.
Parties' Internal Conflicts and the Selection of Candidates
Nominating candidates for Banyuwangi's regentship turned out to be far more 
complicated and full of twists and turns than anyone had predicted. The selection 
process culminated with a major surprise.
The first notable feature of the process for selecting candidates was the counter­
intuitive weakness of political parties in direct local elections. As we have observed,
66 For example, it is well documented that during the turmoil of the 1965-66 massacres, local political and 
religious elites mobilized youth to carry out political violence against members and supporters of the 
Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI). For further discussion, see Robert Cribb, 
ed., The Indonesian Killings o f 1965-1966: Studies from Java and Bali (Clayton, Victoria: Monash University 
Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1990); and Geoffrey Robinson, The Dark Side o f Paradise: Political Violence 
in Bali (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1995).
67 Sunarlan, "Rezim Patrimonial di Tingkat Lokal Pasca-Reformasi," p. 150.
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Indonesia's laws regarding direct local elections favor entrenched parties by 
stipulating that only political parties holding more than 15 percent of the seats in local 
assemblies can nominate candidates for elections. But while this arrangement 
promotes some parties over others, it does not always mean that local party politicians 
benefit from their parties' gatekeeping role in direct local elections. This is because, in 
many instances, it is national party officials who have the final say in the selection of 
nominees. In Banyuwangi, the laws that guided the nominating process guaranteed 
that three major parties would contest the regent election. As Table 4 (below) shows, 
these were the PKB, the PDI-P and Golkar. Based on the traditionalist Islamic 
communities, the PKB has held the most seats in the district since 1999.68 The 
nationalistic PDI-P is the second biggest with twelve seats, while Golkar holds the 
third position with eight seats. The PD and the PPP hold the remaining nine seats.
Table 4: Party Composition in the Banyuwangi District Assembly (2004-2009)
Political Parties Number of Seats Percentage of Total
PKB 16 35
Golkar 8 18
PDI-P 12 27
PPP 4 9
PD 5 11
Total 45 100
Given the strength of the PKB and the PDI-P in the district assembly, one might 
expect that these two parties' candidates would be the most formidable competitors for 
the district's regentship. However, throughout the electoral process, severe internal 
conflicts and fragmentation within these two major parties twisted the electoral map 
and weakened both parties' chances to win the election outright. Over the course of the 
election, both the PKB and the PDI-P in Banyuwangi saw tension grow not only at the 
district level (i.e., among prominent local figures) but also between the national and 
local leaderships.
The outcomes of the process for selecting candidates in the PKB defied 
expectations, as the apparently strongest pair of candidates fell victim to the party's 
internally polarized politics. The PKB's Banyuwangi chapter was split into two 
factions, mirroring the central board's fragmentation into the Choirul Anam (or 
Ulama) faction and the Iskandar Muhaimin faction. In Banyuwangi, the Ulama faction 
was stronger, while the Muhaimin faction controlled the central board. With support 
from the East Java provincial board, the Ulama faction in Banyuwangi nominated 
Achmad Wahyudi, chairman of the Banyuwangi district assembly, and Eko Sukartono, 
a long-term Golkar politician and deputy chairman of the district assembly. In the
68 East Java is one of the strongholds of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the traditionalist Islamic organization that 
claims around thirty million members across the country. Founded by NU leaders, including former 
President Abdurrahman Wahid, the PKB holds sixteen seats in the Banyuwangi district assembly for the 
period 2004-09.
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meantime, with support from the central board, the district's Muhaimin faction 
endorsed the incumbent Samsul Hadi, who had only garnered six out of sixteen PKB 
representatives at the district assembly.
In terms of popularity and electability, the Ulama faction's candidates appeared to 
be in a better position. Wahyudi was a charismatic figure, with broad personal 
networks among local leaders and Muslim communities, while Eko was a veteran 
politician who had been elected four times to the district assembly as a Golkar 
representative.69 Many local people viewed the two long-established and well- 
entrenched local politicians as the most likely to win (or pasangan jadi). In contrast, 
Samsul's nomination came to a dead end. At the time of nomination, he was under 
investigation by the East Java Provincial Police for having allegedly embezzled Rp.251 
million from the district budget.70 Yet despite their popularity among local populations 
and their good connections with other elites, the Wahyudi-Eko pair failed to garner 
support from the other faction at the district level. Neither could they secure their 
candidacy from the party's fragmented and dysfunctional central board.71 Nevertheless, 
the Banyuwangi branch of the Election Commission (KPUD Banyuwangi) accepted the 
Wahyudi-Eko pair's candidacy as legitimate, referring to the law on political parties to 
justify its decision.72
Infighting in the PDI-P was no less chaotic. The PDI-P's national leaders had 
already displayed a tendency to force their chosen candidates on local party chapters 
in other regions. Sure enough, when Banyuwangi's rank-and-file members 
unexpectedly chose a female candidate from outside Banyuwangi, the party's central 
board rejected the decision and selected their own candidates. Ratna Ani Lestari, the 
favorite of the PDI-P's local cadres, was born in Banten, West Java, but grew up in 
Banyuwangi. When the election took place, she had been living in neighboring Bali. 
Married to Gede Winasa, the popular regent of Jembrana district on Bali, Ratna was 
also politically active in that district. Indeed, at the time of the Banyuwangi election, 
Ratna was a member of the PDI-P fraksi in the Jembrana district assembly. 
Remarkably, Ratna won the hearts of the majority of PDI-P cadres in Banyuwangi. But 
she failed to secure support from the party's central board, which instead backed Ali
69 Although Golkar nominated another pair of candidates, Eko argued that he had received unofficial 
support from his fellow Golkar representatives and cadres. Interview with Eko Sukartono, deputy 
chairman of the Banyuwangi District Assembly, Banyuwangi, December 14, 2005.
70 "Bupati Banyuwangi Diperiksa sebagai Tersangka Kasus Korupsi," Kompas, January 19, 2005; and 
"Bupati Banyuwangi Akui Terima Sejumlah Uang," Kompas, March 2, 2005.
71 In fact, it seems that the PKB's fragmentation at the national level worsened as the controversy evolved 
in Banyuwangi over which faction was legitimately eligible to nominate the party's candidate. By the time 
of Banyuwangi's 2005 regent's election, the South Jakarta National Court had ruled that the Muhaimin 
faction was the only legitimate representative of the PKB in that region. However, on November 15, 2005, 
the Supreme Court ruled that the sacking of Alwi Shihab, one of the Ulama faction's prominent leaders, by 
the Muhaimin faction had been an unauthorized decision; this ruling enabled the Ulama faction to argue 
that it was the legitimate voice of the PKB. The Supreme Court finally brought the conflict to an end in 
September 2006 by issuing a ruling that the Muhaimin faction was the only legitimate agent for the party. 
The Ulama faction declared the establishment of the National Ulama Awakening Party (Partai 
Kebangkitan Nasional Ulama, PKNU) in November 2006.
72 Hary Supriyanto, member of the KPUD Banyuwangi, argued that "if there is dualism in the party's 
leadership, and the court has not decided which one is legitimate, the leadership [that existed] before 
conflict began should be regarded as legitimate," referring to Law No. 31 of 2002 on political parties. "KPU 
Banyuwangi Akan Mela wan Terus Ketetapan PTUN," Kompas, April 12, 2005.
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Syaroni, former official in the East Java provincial government, together with Yusuf 
Widyatmoko, chairman of PDI-P's Banyuwangi district board.73 The central board's 
decision incensed many of Banyuwangi's PDI-P cadres, as Ali Syaroni ranked only 
fourth in the party's selection convention. While the Banyuwangi chapter's leadership 
officially followed the central board's instruction, the party's rank-and-file members 
continued to rally around Ratna.74
Other parties' selections of candidates went relatively smoothly and uneventfully. 
As conflicts bedeviled the PKB and PDI-P, Golkar nominated a pair of candidates on 
its own, but their chance to win the election was dim from the beginning. Soesanto 
Soewandi, Golkar's candidate for regent, was a former secretary of the district 
government, but he had been indicted in a corruption case when the election 
occurred.75 Golkar was not as severely fragmented as the other two major parties, but it 
was organized in quite a loose and patchy way. Individual cadres took sides in support 
of different candidates and pursued their personal interests without restraint from 
party leaders. The candidates of the PD-PPP coalition also drew relatively little 
attention, not only because major parties' candidates dominated the electoral stage, but 
because of their past performance. According to Sunarlan of Jember University, who 
has long observed and analyzed Banyuwangi politics, the Masduki-Asyari pair was 
widely regarded as corrupt.76 Therefore, as both Golkar's and the PD-PPP coalition's 
candidates were blemished by corruption charges, they had little chance to win the 
election, a situation that improved the outlook for PKB's Wahyudi and Eko pair in 
their contest to claim the district's top two positions.77
Then there came a last-minute surprise. As all major parties finalized their selection 
of candidates, Ratna managed to collect support from eighteen small parties that had 
no representatives seated in the assembly. The coalition, named the Coalition of Non- 
Parliamentary Parties (Gabungan Partai Politik Non Parlemen, GPPNP), astonishingly 
managed to amass 15.2 percent of the vote out of the 2004 general election results, only 
0.2 percent more than the required minimum.78 After securing her candidacy, Ratna 
strategically chose Yusuf Noeris as her running mate for the deputy regent position. 
Coming from a well-regarded kyai (Islamic preacher) family, Yusuf Noeris was
73 According to Komang Laksana and Bomba Sugiarto, chairman and secretary of the PDI-P in the 
Banyuwangi district assembly, the party originally had twelve potential candidates, but Ratna Ani Lestari 
received the majority of the vote at the party's subdistrict level special convention. The convention 
selected three pairs of candidates and proposed them for a "fit and proper" test to the district board, 
which then short-listed two of them, including Ratna's pair. Interviews with Komang Laksana and Bomba 
Sugiarto, Banyuwangi, December 15, 2005. See also "Di Banyuwangi, Partai Gurem Jadi Kendaraan 
Alternatif Menuju Pencalonan," Kompas, April 6, 2005. Some other sources, including Achmad Wahyudi, 
inferred that Ratna had paid party cadres for their votes. Interview with Achmad Wahyudi, chairman of 
the Banyuwangi District Assembly, Banyuwangi, December 14, 2005.
74 "Kejutan Parpol Gurem di Banyuwangi," Sinar Harapan, June 22, 2005; and "The Disappointed 
Electorates," Tempo 4 3 /V, June 28-July 3, 2005.
75 Interviews with Sunarlan, Lecturer at Jember University, Banyuwangi, December 14-15, 2005.
76 Ibid.
77 My conversations with Banyuwangi people often centered on issues related to corruption, which 
appeared to be one of the determinant issues in the election. See also "Warga Berharap: Banyuwangi Perlu 
Pemimpin Bebas Korupsi," Kompas, April 18, 2005.
78 "Di Banyuwangi, Partai Gurem Jadi Kendaraan Alternatif Menuju Pencalonan," Kompas, April 6, 2005.
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perceived as an influential figure among the NU and pesantren (traditional Islamic 
boarding school) communities.79
Therefore, as Table 5 (below) shows, ultimately five pairs of candidates contested 
for the Banyuwangi regentship. Three major parties nominated three pairs of 
candidates, and the PPP-PD coalition nominated another pair of candidates, while 
eighteen small parties that held no seats in the assembly managed to build a coalition 
and added a pair of candidates to the electoral field.
Table 5: Candidates and Supporting Parties in Banyuwangi's 2005 Regent Election
Candidates
Supporting Parties 
(Percentage of the Vote Gained in 
the 2004 Elections)
Achmad Wahyudi & 
Eko Sukartono PKB (34.5 %)
Masduki Soe'oed & 
Syafi'i Asyari PD and PPP (11.6 %)
Soesanto Suwandi & 
Abdul Kadir Golkar (15.0 %)
Ratna Ani Lestari & 
Yusuf Noeris 18 small parties (15.2 %)*
Ali Syahroni & 
Yusuf Widyatmoko PDI-P (23.7 %)
* Freedom Bull National Party (Partai Nasional Banteng Kemerdekaan, PNBK), Freedom Party (Partai 
Merdeka), National Mandate Party (PAN), Reform Star Party (PBR), Pancasila Patriots' Party (Partai 
Patriot Pancasila), Indonesian Nahdlatul Community Party (Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah 
Indonesia, PPNUI), Crescent Star Party (PBB), Prosperous Peace Party (PDS), Pioneers' Party (Partai 
Pelopor), Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), Concern for the Nation Functional Party (PKPB), Indonesian 
Justice and Unity Party (PKPI), Socialist Democratic Labor Party (Partai Buruh Sosial Demokrat, PBSD), 
Marhaenism Indonesian National Party (PNI Marhaenisme), United Democratic Nationhood Party (Partai 
Persatuan Demokrasi Kebangsaan, PPDK), Indonesian Democratic Vanguard Party (Partai Penegak 
Demokrasi Indonesia, PPDI), Indonesian Unity Party (Partai Sarikat Indonesia, PSI), and Regional United 
Party (Partai Persatuan Daerah, PPD).
The Hazards of Patrimonial Politics
The electoral process in Banyuwangi was complicated not only by the major 
parties' internal fragmentation and intervention from the central boards, but also by 
entrenched elites' patrimonial manipulations. In particular, the incumbent regent, 
Samsul Hadi, did not willingly give up his political ambitions. He not only vigorously 
lobbied the PKB's central board and various local leaders to seek re-election, but tried 
to intervene in the electoral process by using his patrimonial relationships. He also
79 Interviews with Nurhadi, lawyer at the Surabaya Legal Aid Institute, a branch of the Indonesian Legal 
Aid Foundation (Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia, YLBHI), Surabaya, December 13, 2005. 
Nurhadi was originally from Banyuwangi,
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relentlessly mobilized his mass base and tried to wield leverage over local institutions, 
as well as lower-ranking bureaucrats.
Under investigation for a corruption charge, Samsul Hadi first attempted to delay 
the electoral process. He did so by intimidating the KPUD Banyuwangi. On March 28, 
the PKB's first chairman and former President Abdurrahman Wahid warned that his 
party would boycott the Banyuwangi regent's election if the KPUD Banyuwangi 
continued to reject Samsul's candidacy.80 Samsul then threatened the KPUD, claiming 
that his regency would not approve its request for election funds, even though the 
funds were already allocated from the district budget.81 In response, the KPUD warned 
him that it would report him directly to President Yudhoyono.82 Samsul also lobbied 
assembly members to consider delaying the election. However, a legal case against 
Samsul proceeded as these events were unfolding, and the East Java Provincial Police 
confiscated his properties and house.83 The next day, several placards appeared on 
Banyuwangi's main streets with messages of support for Samsul.84 Taking Samsul's 
side, the Banyuwangi branch of the Election Supervisory Committee (Panwas 
Banyuwangi) refused to pull them down, arguing that it did not have enough 
manpower to do so.85 Panwas Banyuwangi also called for delay of the election.
In addition, Samsul mobilized his grassroots supporters. After the KPUD finalized 
the list of candidates on April 22, hundreds of Samsul's supporters staged a 
demonstration in front of the KPUD office.86 On April 27, Samsul's supporters held a 
press conference under the banner of the Struggle Committee for Democracy (Komite 
Perjuangan untuk Demokrasi, K-PUD) and asked that the election be delayed.87 Village 
heads organized under various organizations, including the Banyuwangi District 
Forum of Village Heads (Forum Kepala Desa Kabupaten Banyuwangi, Fokus), also 
protested against the KPUD's decision.88 Various groups of Samsul Hadi's supporters 
staged sit-in protests in the KPUD's office, demanding the withdrawal of its decision.89 
The KPUD had to move to a temporary office at the local assembly building, and a
80 The PKB's central board also annulled cadre Achmad Wahyudi's membership in the party, a move that 
was immediately criticized by the Ulama faction's Choirul Anam for violating the party's internal 
regulations. The Banyuwangi State Court later ruled that the cancellation of Wahyudi's membership as a 
PKB cadre was illegitimate. See "DPP PKB Resmi Gugat KPU Banyuwangi," Kompas, April 9, 2005; and 
"Pembekuan DPC PKB Achmad Wahyudi Tidak Sah," Kompas, April 23, 2005.
81 "Soal Dana Pilkada: Gubernur Akan Lapor ke Pusat," Kompas, March 31, 2005; "Bila Dana Pilkada Tak 
Kunjung Cair," Kompas, April 11, 2005; and "10 Kabupaten/Kota Jatim Siap Pilkada," Suara Merdeka, June 
6, 2005.
82 "KPUD Banyuwangi Akan Laporkan Bupati ke Presiden," Tempointeraktif, March 30, 2005.
83 "Tanah dan Rumah Bupati Banyuwangi Disita," Kompas, April 14, 2005.
84 "Marak, Spanduk Dukungan untuk Samsul Hadi," Kompas, April 14, 2005.
85 "Spanduk Bukan Urusan Pemkab Banyuwangi," Kompas, April 16, 2005. According to Pebdi 
Arisdiawan, a Golkar representative in the district assembly, some of KPUD's members were in conflict 
with Samsul Hadi, while members of Panwas Banyuwangi were Samsul's delegates (or titipan). Interview 
with Pebdi Arisdiawan, a Golkar representative at the Banyuwangi District Assembly, Banyuwangi, 
December 14, 2005.
86 "Pendukung Samsul Ancam Jegal Pilkada," Kompas, April 27, 2005.
87 "40 LSM Minta Pilkada Ditunda," Kompas, April 28, 2005.
88 "Tak Perlu Saling Menyalahkan," Kompas, June 2, 2005.
89 "Warga Banyuwangi Kembali Tuntut Pembekuan KPUD," Kompas, May 11, 2005; and "Pendukung 
Samsul Tekan KPU Banyuwangi," Kompas, May 27, 2005.
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week passed before the police eventually took action to drive the demonstrators out of 
the KPUD office.90 As the campaign went on, Samsul Hadi's supporters attempted to 
disrupt the electoral process. In mid-May, for example, an organization called the City 
Society Forum (Forum Masyarakat Kota, Maskot) sent out a letter to several subdistrict 
heads asking for them to delay setting up village-level committees to organize and 
oversee polling stations.91 In a separate move, five organizations filed a class-action suit 
against the KPUD in the Banyuwangi State Court and asked for the court to suspend 
all preparation and campaigning for the election.92
Despite the pressure from Samsul and his administration, the KPUD Banyuwangi 
remained resolute in sticking to its original timetable.93 However, in the middle of the 
electoral process, four secretaries assigned by the district government to the KPUD 
suddenly resigned from their positions.94 This tactic was apparently intended to 
disrupt the electoral process, because all the KPUD's administrative decisions required 
the signatures of these officials. Those who were trying to set up polling stations in 
villages also faced problems. Some villages were reportedly unprepared for voting 
because civil servants had not (intentionally or unintentionally) obtained the necessary 
permit from the district government that would license them to monitor the voting.95 In 
response to this hurdle, the KPUD had to recruit volunteers to help monitor polling 
stations.96
Notwithstanding Samsul's powerful networks and influence, the people of 
Banyuwangi did not unanimously support his political ambition. According to 
Sunarlan's observation, Banyuwangi's residents had grown discontented with 
Samsul's governing style, which relied heavily on patronage networks and a 
patrimonial influence.97 As his supporters staged rallies to interrupt the electoral 
process, opposition against Samsul's political maneuvering gradually gathered force. 
Prominent local Islamic preachers (kyai) expressed their support for the KPUD. 
Hundreds of local people staged a demonstration under the banner of the Democracy 
Society Forum (Forum Masyarakat Demokrasi), asking for the KPUD to stick to its
90 "Pendukung Samsul Duduki KPUD," Kompas, May 28, 2005; "Kantor Diduduki, KPUD Pindah ke 
DPRD," Kompas, June 4, 2005; and "KPU dievakuasi ke DPRD," Radar Banyuwangi, June 4, 2005.
91 "Camat Didesak Menunda Pembentukan PPS," Kompas, May 13, 2005.
92 The five organizations include the Banyuwangi Society Forum Caring for Education (Forum Masyarakat 
Peduli Pendidikan Banyuwangi), the Asia Pacific Institute (Asia Pasifik Institut), the Artnisa Image (Citra 
Annisa), the Ulama Work Squad (Satuan Karya Ulama), and the National Development Foundation 
(Yayasan Pembangunan Bangsa). In a separate legal case, the State Administrative Court (PTUN, 
Pengadilan Tata Usaha Negara) in Surabaya ruled on May 25 that the KPUD should accept the candidates 
nominated by the Hasyim Cholil faction, i.e., Samsul Hadi and Gatot Sirajuddin. However, it contradicted 
an earlier ruling by the Banyuwangi State Court that Wahyudi's leadership was the only legitimate one for 
the PKB's Banyuwangi district board. This legal inconsistency certainly added confusion to the dispute 
between the two factions. See "Dinilai Inkonstitusional, KPU Banyuwangi Digugat Lima LSM," Kompas, 
May 25, 2005; and "DPP PKB Menangi Gugatan di PTUN," Kompas, May 26, 2005.
93 "Pendukung Samsul Ancam Jegal Pilkada," Kompas, April 27, 2005.
94 "Sekretaris KPUD Mengundurkan Diri," Kompas, May 3, 2005.
95 "Separuh PPK dan PPS Belum Siap Gelar Pilkada," Kompas, May 28, 2005; "Tak perlu Saling 
Menyalahkan," Kompas, June 2, 2005; "Izin PNS Dikeluhkan: Bagi Yang Terlibat Kepanitiaan Pilkadal," 
Radar Banyuwangi, June 11, 2005; and "PNS Belum Boleh Jadi PPS dan KPPS," Kompas, June 11, 2005.
96 "KPU Siapkan 17,000 Relawan," Radar Banyuwangi, June 9, 2005; and "KPU Banyuwangi Turunkan 
17,000 Relawan," Kompas, June 9, 2005.
97 Sunarlan, "Rezim Patrimonial di Tingkat Lokal Pasca-Reformasi."
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original election-day schedule.98 Local politicians were apparently distressed by 
Samsul's personalistic politics and style of governance.99 Ultimately, despite his 
extensive personal networks, Samsul failed to garner support from influential local 
elites, particularly religious leaders and assembly members.100
Samsul failed to secure his own candidacy, but his patrimonial manipulation and 
intimidation disrupted the smooth implementation of the election. Threatened by 
incessant mass rallies, uncertainty about the KPUD's capacity, and growing social 
instability, assembly members and government officials even contemplated delaying 
the election. However, the KPUD Banyuwangi and some other local leaders were 
under enormous pressure to stage the election successfully, which meant that they 
needed to implement the rest of the electoral process as scheduled.101 Under these 
circumstances, a week before the voting, the Department of Home Affairs made clear 
that it rejected the proposal to delay the polling.
The Election Results: Neither Anticipated Nor Surprising
On June 20, voting for Banyuwangi's first direct regent's election proceeded as 
scheduled. Slightly over two-thirds of 1.2 million registered voters (67.7 percent) cast 
votes that day. The turnout was low compared to the percentage of voters who had 
participated in the previous year's national elections—78.5 percent at the April general 
election and 79.5 percent in the first round of the presidential election. One of the 
factors dampening participation was that many local people, including three 
candidates from outside Banyuwangi, had failed to register at the KPUD.102 The results 
of Banyuwangi's first direct regent's election were a big surprise to many people, 
especially the elites. As Table 6 (below) shows, Ratna Ani Lestari and Yusuf Noeris 
unexpectedly won the election with more than a third of the vote (38 percent), taking 
twenty-one out of twenty-four subdistricts. The favorite Wahyudi-Eko pair received 
only 15 percent of the vote, coming in behind the Soesanto-Kadir pair, which gained 19 
percent. On July 1, the KPUD Banyuwangi announced Ratna Ani Lestari and Yusuf 
Noeris as the winners.
Although it had not been anticipated, Ratna's victory was not that surprising to 
some Banyuwangi voters. While local party leaders were busy juggling with internal 
conflicts, a series of interviews conducted by the national daily Kompas revealed that 
many citizens in Banyuwangi regarded "free from corruption" (betas dari korupsi) as 
the most important criterion of the election. The interviews also unveiled a high level 
of pessimism among local people about their first direct regent's election. Those 
interviewed related that almost all the candidates had been involved in corruption and
98 "Pemkab Banyuwangi Kembali Tawarkan Pengunduran Pilkada," Kompas, May 31, 2005.
99 Interview with Pebdi Arisdiawan, December 14, 2005; interveiw with Eko Sukartono, December 14, 
2005; and interviews with Komang Laksana and Bomba Sugiarto, December 15, 2005.
100 "pii^da Ditunda, Peserta Ancam Ajukan Gugatan," Kompas, June 2, 2005.
101 See a media interview with Ahmad Syakib, chairman of the KPUD Banyuwangi, "Pilkada Banyuwangi 
Tetap 20 Juni," Kompas, May 30, 2005.
102 Voters were required to have lived in the appropriate voting district for six consecutive months to be 
qualified. At the time of the election, Ratna lived in Jembrana, Bali, and Ali Syaroni and Syafi'I Asyari 
resided in Surabaya and Jember, East Java, respectively.
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that none could change the situation and reform the local government to make it more 
honest and responsive.103 Given this evidence, one can infer that Banyuwangi voters
Table 6: The 2005 Banyuwangi Regent's Election Results
Candidates Received Votes (Percentage)
Received Votes in the 2004 
General Elections (Percentage)
Achmad Wahyudi & 
Eko Sukartono 120,865 (15.3) 306,207 (34.5)
Masduki Suud & 
Syafi'I Asyari 114,677 (14.5) 103,294 (11.6)
Soesanto Suwandi & 
Abdul Kadir 150,829 (19.0) 132,828 (15.0)
Ratna Ani Lestari & 
Yusuf Noeris 311,653 (39.3) 134,755 (15.2)
Ali Syahroni & 
Yusuf Widyatmoko 94,454 (11.9) 210,305 (23.7)
Total 792,478 (100) 887,389 (100)
Source: Banyuwangi's Election Commission (KPUD Banyuwangi)
decided to pursue practical benefits, such as the "free education" and "free health 
services" that the Ratna campaign promised.104 They had heard a lot about her 
husband's administration in Jembrana, which successfully implemented free education 
and health-service programs. In fact, Jembrana's success stories had already drawn 
wide attention from both domestic and international observers.105 While other 
candidates relied on religious rhetoric and large-scale outdoor rallies, the Ratna-Yusuf 
pair campaigned by visiting residents door-to-door, promising to work for a clean 
government and vowing to fight corruption. The media's positive coverage of the 
programs advocated by Ratna and her partner that targeted poor families in need of 
better access to education and medicine further boosted her campaign.106
Additionally, Ratna took advantage of the dual leadership within the PKB and, 
particularly, of the personal rivalry between district assembly chairman Achmad 
Wahyudi and incumbent regent Samsul Hadi.107 As mentioned earlier, Banyuwangi's
103 Anita Yossihara, "Warga Berharap: Banyuwangi Perlu Pemimpin Bebas Korupsi," Kornpas, April 18, 
2005.
104 Samuel Batarede, "Kekalahan Sejumlah Calon adalah Kegagalan Partai," Kornpas, June 27, 2005; and 
Ambrosius Harto, "'Dinamit' Itu Pasangan Ratna-Yusuf: Partai Politik Lokal Tak Bisa Jual Jagonya," 
Kornpas, July 8, 2005.
105 Indira Permanasari, "Di Jembrana, Bali: Pendidikan dan Kesehatan Bukan Barang Mewah," Kornpas, 
November 6, 2004; and Arya B. Gaduh and Laila Kuznezov, "Making Services Work for the Poor in 
Indonesia, Case Study 6: Health Insurance Reform in Jembrana District, Bali Province," report, The Ash 
Institute and the World Bank, September 2005.
106 Interview with Nurhadi, December 13, 2005; interview with Samsudin Adlawi, director of Radar 
Banyuwangi, Banyuwangi, December 15, 2005; and see also "Pilkada Masih Terkendala Dualisme Calon," 
Kornpas, April 30, 2005.
107 It was rumored that Samsul decided to support Ratna when he finally gave up seeking re-election. 
Supposedly, by endorsing Ratna rather than his rival Sahyudi, he tried to maintain his influence over
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two most powerful figures had to deal with internal strife in their party, as well as 
charges or rumors about their involvement in corruption. Banyuwangi's voters were 
also disappointed with the PKB's leaders, both national and local, who tended to 
impose their decisions on the local branches and value their own political and 
economic interests above the constituents' aspirations.108 Embracing local people's 
disenchantment, Ratna developed a strong mass base with promises about free 
education and health services. Unable to rely on strong party machines, Ratna instead 
contacted voters directly and, in doing so, her partner Yusuf Noeris's support among 
the NU and pesantren communities proved to be helpful.
"Denying" the Election Results
While it did not shock the masses, the election outcome was a big surprise to many 
local elites. Both Banyuwangi's politicians and religious leaders saw the newly elected 
regent as a political threat and cultural challenge to their patrimonial domination, and 
they shared a sense of crisis, as they feared loss of their control over power and 
resources.109 Accustomed to an overwhelmingly male-dominated political leadership, 
they also showed some degree of reluctance to pay respect to a female bupati. 
Banyuwangi elites' unhappiness about the election results was transmitted into two 
sensitive issues: religion and money. By translating the electoral dispute into issues 
concerning faith and morality, Banyuwangi's dominant elites justified their collective 
aversion to the newly elected regent and inflamed their own supporters' passions. 
Below I briefly look at each issue in turn, and then examine the elites' attempt to 
politicize the district assembly to maintain their power.
First, Ratna's unforeseen electoral victory put her under scrutiny by Banyuwangi's 
Muslim communities. Her religious background as a Muslim married to a Hindu 
quickly dominated the post-election discourse. It was actually one of the major issues 
addressed during the campaigns, but it became a divisive issue only after the polling 
was over.110 Islamic leaders suspected that she could not maintain her Muslim identity 
while being married to a Hindu and even argued that her government would threaten 
the safety of Banyuwangi's Muslim communities. However, what they seemed to be 
more concerned about was Ratna's personality. Some leaders commented on her style 
or image as "arrogant," "unfriendly," and "vulgar." They also criticized Ratna for 
showing a tendency to be "suspicious of local bureaucrats as dishonest and corrupt." 
Interestingly, ordinary Banyuwangi people portrayed Ratna in very different ways. 
Local people and journalists usually described her as "accessible," "friendly," and 
"caring."111 Drawing on conversations with various sources, one could conclude that it
bureaucrats and other personal connections. Interview with Samsudin Adlawi, director of Radar 
Banyuwangi, Banyuwangi, December 15, 2005.
108 Sunarlan, "Rezim Patrimonial di Tingkat Lokal Pasca-Reformasi."
109 Samsudin Adlawi pointed out that the complaints filed by the thirteen small parties were just "made 
up" (or diada-adakan). Interview with Samsudin Adlawi, December 15, 2005.
110 Interview with Nurhadi, December 13, 2005.
111 From various interviews, Surabaya and Banyuwangi, December 13-15, 2005. According to Samsudin 
Adlawi, Ratna adopted Banyuwangi's native egalitarian culture (originally derived from the Osing 
communities, for the Osing speak a non-hierarchical dialect rather than hierarchical Javanese). Unlike 
other local elites who commanded traditional paternalistic networks, Ratna became popular among local
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was Ratna's political, rather than religious, platform that made many Banyuwangi 
elites uncomfortable with her victory. In an interview with me, the well-respected kyai 
K. H. Samsul Mu'arif implied that Banyuwangi's local elites were frustrated by her 
unwillingness to compromise with the district's entrenched elites.112
Though most agreed that Ratna's religious situation was politically scandalous, the 
district's Islamic leaders were far from being united in making this case. A few Islamic 
leaders did not wish to insult her partner, Yusuf Noeris, whose grandfather and father 
were widely respected for their contributions to Nahdlatul Ulama. Also, although 
religious leaders have often exerted political leverage over the political process in 
Banyuwangi, some segments of Banyuwangi society have grown increasingly less 
tolerant of the kyai's involvement in politics. In a one-day seminar held during the 
election, for example, some local youth leaders and NU followers openly criticized the 
kyai for becoming too deeply involved in local politics and power struggles.113
Choosing a different approach to challenge the victor's popular mandate, 
Banyuwangi's political elites leveled allegations that Ratna had been involved in 
money politics. Those allegations had already circulated during the campaigns but 
gained serious attention only after the election results were announced.114 Members of 
the Banyuwangi district assembly, including assembly chairman Achmad Wahyudi, 
attributed Ratna's electoral victory to her exploitation of money politics.115 Both the 
Masduki-Asyari and Soesanto-Kadir pairs also accused the Ratna-Yusuf pair of 
buying votes.116 However, given that other candidates staged much bigger rallies and 
that most accusations against the Ratna camp emerged after the election results were 
known, it became clear that such allegations were meant to undermine the legitimacy 
of her mandate and justify a call for a new round of voting. As evidence from other 
elections shows, the significance of money politics in Indonesia's direct local elections 
has, indeed, not decreased.117 On the contrary, it is now an established practice that 
candidates have to make financial contributions to the parties from which they seek 
nominations. All the successful nominees, then, have to finance their campaigns 
without much financial support from party machines. The nominees usually distribute 
food, T-shirts, cigarette money (uang rokok), transportation money (uang transportasi), or 
gifts (often through lucky draws, or hadiah undian) to rally attendants. Candidates also
people with her low-key manner. Even after being elected, Ratna was reported to have continued making 
regular visits to villages (turun ke bawah), sometimes with her husband, over the weekends. Interview with 
Samsudin Adlawi, December 15, 2005; see also Beatty, Varieties o f  Javanese Religion, pp. 18-19.
112 Interview with KH Syamsul Mu'arif, kyai, Banyuwangi, December 15, 2005.
113 "Legitimasi Kyai dan Kekuasaan" [Kyai's Legitimacy and Power], seminar organized by the NU 
Student Association (Ikatan Pemuda Nahdlatul Ulama, IPNU) in the Glenmore subdistrict on June 16, 
2005. See "Kiai Tidak Harus Netral Dalam Politik Praktis Pilkadal," Radar Banyuwangi, June 17, 2005.
114 Such allegations appeared in various media reports, including "Politik Uang, Uang, Uang Politik...," 
Kompas, June 14, 2005.
115 Interview with Achmad Wahyudi, December 14, 2005.
116 "Penghitungan Akhir Pilkada nyaris Bentrok," Bali Post, June 29, 2005.
117 See, for example, Syarif Hidayat, "Pilkada, Money Politics, and the Dangers of 'Informal Governance' 
Practices," in Deepening Democracy in Indonesia? Direct Elections fo r  Local Leaders (Pilkada), ed. Erb and 
Priyambudi Slistiyanto (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), pp. 125—46.
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often promise village leaders that they will make contributions (sumbangan) to their 
communal projects if they are elected.118
Although their discourse focused on religion and money politics, Banyuwangi 
elites seemed to be particularly concerned about the impact of Ratna's election on the 
district's political dynamics. The prospect that her regentship would change the usual 
ways of getting things done in Banyuwangi—including relations among various 
political institutions, and between the government and diverse political, economic, and 
social interests—could be particularly troublesome. It is also apparent that they were 
embarrassed by the fact that Banyuwangi's people chose Ratna despite the established 
linkages and networks that should have joined the elites to the masses and secured the 
people's allegiance. As director of local daily Bandar Banyuwangi, Samsudin Adlawi, 
pointed out, Banyuwangi's entrenched elites were alarmed by the fact that Ratna 
successfully penetrated into their bases of grassroots support.119 Therefore, even before 
taking office, Banyuwangi's first directly elected regent faced strong resentment from 
various groups of local elites.
Ratna's first challenge came from within the party coalition that nominated her: 
thirteen of the eighteen parties filed complaints regarding her and Yusuf's candidacy 
at the district court.120 But the Banyuwangi National Court rejected the case because of 
insufficient evidence.121 Then, a bigger challenge came from the Banyuwangi district 
assembly, which decided to reject the election results. In principle, local assemblies 
have no authority to reject election results. They can only submit recommendations 
regarding the inauguration of elected government heads to the Ministry of Home 
Affairs.122 However, Banyuwangi assembly members argued that the Ratna-Yusuf 
pair's nomination was legally flawed because some of the supporting parties actually 
had not endorsed the victors' candidacy. For the next four months, both political and 
religious leaders, sharing a sense of crisis, jointly fought to block Ratna from taking
118 It is interesting to question how much more money has been used under a direct electoral system 
compared with the previous indirect system, but it is not easy to answer. All the pairs of candidates have 
to report their campaign funds to the KPUD after voting is complete (the Ratna-Yusuf pair reported the 
largest campaign fund among the five pairs), but this routine is fairly procedural, and the KPUD usually 
accepts the reports without submitting them to any validation process. It can be assumed that buying 
votes from a large pool of ordinary voters might be more costly than the earlier practices, but the previous 
indirect electoral system was also notoriously costly, for candidates had to "secure" assembly members' 
votes by paying or promising (tens o f) millions of Rupiah per vote. For a case study of the indirect 
electoral system, see Choi, "Local Elections and Party Politics in Post-Reformasi Indonesia." For more 
detailed discussion of the relationship between the change to a direct electoral system and money politics, 
see Choi, "Local Elections and Democracy in Indonesia," and Choi, "Elections, Parties, and Elites."
119 Interview with Samsudin Adlawi, Banyuwangi, December 15, 2005.
120 In fact, even before election day, five parties of the GNNP coalition tried to withdraw their support for 
the Ratna-Yusuf pair. On May 30, the PKS, PAN, PKPB, PNBK, and the Freedom Party officially informed 
the KPUD of their withdrawal, arguing that their nomination of the Ratna-Yusuf pair had been flawed 
because the nomination letter was not signed by the parties' chairmen. The KPUD Banyuwangi did not 
accept such an argument. See "18 Partai Cabut Pencalonan Ratna-Yusuf," Kompas, May 31, 2005.
121 "Gugatan Parpol Gurem Ditolak," Radar Banyuwangi, August 13, 2005.
122 Addressing the ambiguity of Law No. 32 of 2004 on this matter, the Department of Home Affairs issued 
a circulation letter (Surat Edaran No. 120/1559/ SJ) on June 27, 2005. The letter disallows local assemblies to 
intervene in determining the fate of elected local government heads. In legal terms, local assemblies have 
no right or authority to reject the KPUD's determination regarding the election results. Sidik Pramono, 
"Cara Baru Mengganjal Kepala Daerah Baru," Kompas, July 20, 2005.
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office. Threatened by an outsider's seizure of power, Banyuwangi's entrenched elites 
collectively rejected the legitimacy of the new government.
However, unity among Banyuwangi political elites did not last long. The PDI-P's 
central board changed its position to recognize Ratna as its cadre and instructed its 
Banyuwangi chapter to support her inauguration. 123 Accordingly, the PDI-P 
representatives at the district assembly changed their position, splitting the assembly. 
Additionally, an informal cross-party alliance added some more twists to the political 
dynamics at the assembly. Consisting of around fifteen young party politicians, the 
Young Caucus (kaukus muda) voiced views different from their parties' official lines. 
Pebdi Arisdiawan, a Golkar representative who had been present at the assembly and 
had acted as the group's spokesperson, explained to me that, as a loose and non­
binding group, the Young Caucus tried to mediate among different views in the midst 
of growing political havoc.124 Samsudin Adlawi attributed the emergence of such a 
group to the young politicians' mutual dissatisfaction with the entrenched leaders.125 
With the pressure building within the assembly, the assembly's leaders finally held a 
series of meetings with party leaders to discuss the newly elected regent's 
inauguration.
Unyielding Patrimonial Domination
Four months after the voting, the Banyuwangi district assembly finally accepted 
the election results and let the winners take office. However, this was not the end of the 
mayhem that the district's first direct regent's election introduced into local society. In 
fact, Banyuwangi's politics and governance continued to be fractured by a bitter power 
struggle between the new regent and entrenched elites who were unwilling to yield 
their patrimonial dominance.
On October 20, along with deputy regent Yusuf Noeris, Ratna was sworn in at the 
district hall, not at the conventional assembly building. The ceremony was markedly 
Islamic, assuaging many people's doubts about the regent's religious commitment. 
However, the inauguration did not put an end to the Banyuwangi elites' 
manipulations. Right after the inauguration ceremony, for instance, Achmad Wahyudi, 
the losing candidate who was now back to being district assembly chairman, warned 
that "the tension between the executive and the legislature may [continue to] happen 
and [the district's political future] depends on the new regent's and deputy regent's 
ability to create good communication [with other local leaders]."126 Unfortunately, the 
district government had been highly politicized under Samsul Hadi's leadership, and 
Ratna's attempt to run her government on the basis of performance, rather than 
patrimonial networks, proved to be unworkable. Reluctant to compromise with the
123 Interviews with Komang Laksana and Bomba Sugiarto, December 15, 2005.
124 Interview with Pebdi Arisdiawan, December 14, 2005. Members of the Young Caucus visited the 
Department of Home Affairs in Jakarta to mediate among different facbons at the assembly. See "Geng 
Muda DPRD Segera Temui Mendagri," Radar Banyuwangi, August 12, 2005.
125 Interview with Samsudin Adlawi, December 15, 2005.
126 "Ratna-Nuris Dilantik: Pengamanan Dilakukan Secara Ketat," Kompas, October 21, 2005. In an interview 
with me, Achmad Wahyudi criticized the elected regent's style as "arrogant" and called her 
"unapproachable." Interview with Achmad Wahyudi, December 14, 2005.
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entrenched elites, Ratna also failed to integrate different groups of political and 
religious interests into her administration.127
The continuing struggle culminated in May 2006, almost a year after the election. 
On May 4, thousands of Banyuwangi people staged a demonstration in front of the 
regent's office and asked her to resign within twenty-four hours.128 Joining the mass 
rally, Islamic leaders led by K. H. Hisyam Syafa'at argued that Banyuwangi's social 
conditions had not improved since Ratna took power.129 As a response to this protest, 
district assembly members held a special session and decided to impeach Ratna (the 
meeting did not have a quorum, which requires that two-thirds of the members be 
present). Ratna fought back by pointing out that the local assembly had no authority to 
impeach her, but district assembly members intensely lobbied East Java's governor and 
the national assembly.130 Ultimately, Banyuwangi's elites failed again to garner enough 
support to regain their control over local governance, while Ratna survived another 
crisis. However, Banyuwangi's politics have continued to stagger, crippled by the 
ongoing tension between a directly elected regent's fight to establish her legitimacy 
and entrenched elites' refusal to give up their privileges.131
Conclusion: Democracy and Patrimonial Politics
Indonesia's direct local elections are the latest step in a series of political reforms 
that have transformed the country's political system to become more democratic and
127 It seems that Ratna chose to confront, rather than compromise with, the district assembly. It was 
reported that she had issued a number of decrees without consulting party leaders at the assembly. For 
instance, her decision to include pork prices in the district7s consumer-price index became highly 
controversial, since over 90 percent of the local population was officially Muslim. Decrees concerning the 
provision of free healthcare and education also stirred up controversy because the policies excluded 
private schools that enroll students from poor families. More importantly, as many Islamic leaders 
complained, the education policy excluded Islamic educational institutions from receiving benefits. See 
"Banyuwangi: Kiai Datangi Gubernur Jawa Timur," Kornpas, May 9, 2006. Similarly, the free healthcare 
provision was criticized because the policy caused financial problems for many community health centers. 
See Indra Harsaputra and Iman D. Nugroho, "Banyuwangi Regent Reaches out to Ulema," The Jakarta 
Post, May 10, 2006. Ratna's administration also ignored the district assembly's budgetary request for the 
district's 2006 budget. According to Samsudin Adlawi, she also tried to eradicate corruption from the 
government. Under Samsul Hadi, around Rp.30 billion had been transferred to the regent, department 
heads, and assembly members as "fees," fees that comprised, in total, on average, 10 to 25 percent of the 
cost of any government project. Ratna instead tried to introduce the "functional bonus" in order to 
discourage officials' involvement in corrupt practices: Interview with Samsudin Adlawi, December 15, 
2005.
128 "Demo 7,000 Orang: Bupati Banyuwangi Didesak Mundur," Kompas, May 5, 2006.
129 "Dewan Copot Bupati Ratna," Surya, May 5, 2006.
130 "Ratna Ani Lestari Refuses to Resign against Strong Pressures," Antara, May 7, 2006; and "Perbaiki 
Komunikasi Politik: Wakil Bupati Banyuwangi Dekati Tokoh Ulama," Kompas, May 10, 2006. The fact that 
local assembly members have no authority to impeach local government heads (Article 29 of Law No. 32 
of 2004) could have given Ratna more leverage in managing her administration and implementing major 
policies, but, at the same time, it appeared to motivate local elites to try to mobilize their mass base in an 
attempt to destabilize her government.
131 According to a report, candidates nominated by majority parties won in only a third of the elections 
held between June 2005 and June 2006, while candidates nominated by minority parties or party coalitions 
won in the rest. As the Banyuwangi case demonstrates, local government heads with weak support at 
local assemblies have faced difficulty in working with assembly members, a widespread pattern that could 
result in "a nightmare to democratic process at the local level." See Suwardiman, "Hubungan Legislatif- 
Eksekutif: Di Tengah Samarnya Mekanisme Perundangan," Kompas, July 13, 2006.
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decentralized. There is little doubt that these elections have, indeed, further localized 
power and electoral democracy in Indonesia. However, this does not necessarily mean 
that the decentralized elections have made local power struggles more accessible, 
transparent, or fair. Two notable features have instead characterized Indonesia's direct 
local elections: intensified power struggles for local governance and the fragility of 
democratic institutions in the face of local elites' patrimonial manipulations.
Local governments have for a long time been important sources of power and 
patrimonial networks in Indonesia. They have often functioned as the greatest sources 
of employment and the most important conduits for granting access to resources in the 
regions. Local governments have also been at the center of production (and 
reproduction) of patrimonial networks connecting diverse local interests.132 Under the 
New Order, local elites were weaker in their relation to national decision-makers, but it 
does not mean that they were powerless in their own localities. In fact, under Suharto's 
patrimonial governance system, civil servants and local politicians lived comfortably 
and gained considerable power and wealth, with privileged access to resources and 
power.133 During this period, local elites relied on their informal networks to obtain 
local power and prestige, and, in turn, used their positions and access to resources to 
maintain their informal networks. The 1998 regime change and subsequent political 
reform have brought considerable changes to Indonesia's political system, particularly 
at local levels. Extensive decentralization measures put district-level governments at 
the center of administrative, fiscal, and political reforms. In consequence, district 
governments have assumed a wide range of authority, along with funds distributed by 
the central government.
However, these institutional changes have not fundamentally transformed the 
power configurations in the regions. Decentralization has certainly brought decision­
making closer to local people, but the act of devolving power and resources has proved 
to be "only a necessary and not sufficient condition for effective and transparent local 
governments."134 In practice, Indonesia's decentralization has allowed entrenched local 
elites to enhance their power bases and access to resources and, most importantly, 
provided them with new opportunities to contest for decentralized power and 
governance. Well-established local elites promptly adapted themselves to new political 
and social circumstances in order to maintain their privileges and access to resources.135
132 Schulte Nordholt, "Renegotiating Boundaries: Access, Agency, and Identity in Post-Soeharto 
Indonesia."
133 Hans Antlov, "The Making of Democratic Local Governance in Indonesia," paper presented at the 
International Workshop on "Participatory Planning: Approaches for Local Governance," Bandung, 
January 20-27, 2002, pp. 2-3.
134 Ibid. p. 13; see also, Derick Brinkerhoff and Arthur A. Goldsmith, "Clientelism, Patrimonialism, and 
Democratic Governance: An Overview and Framework for Assessment and Programming," paper 
presented for the US Agency for International Development Office of Democracy and Governance (2002), 
p. 32.
135 Using research data compiled by Demos (Centre for Democracy and Human Rights Studies), A. E. 
Priyono suggested that state institutions and resources are the main resources of local power in post-New 
Order Indonesia. Regarding the phenomenon that he defines as the rise of "oligarchic democracy," he 
argues that "the economic-political sources of the state has become the pillar of the power of the dominant 
(local) actors—just the way it has been taught to them by their teachers from the New Order era." See A. E. 
Priyono, "Local Politics in Post-New Order Indonesia: Local Democratisation or Decentralization of 
Oligarchy?" paper presented at the workshop on "Democratizing Decentralisation and Deconcentration:
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Along with a small group of new faces, well-established bureaucrats and 
businesspeople quickly joined the local chapters of major parties and ran for seats in 
local assemblies or competed to become local government heads.136 As a result, today 
Indonesia's local political system displays some degree of hybridity, in which 
patrimonial elite politics pervade democratic political institutions and processes. 
Political parties' monopoly over the nomination of candidates in direct local elections 
has certainly helped affluent and well-connected local elites dominate the electoral 
field. Dominant parties still act as gatekeepers, and entrenched local elites who pay 
those gatekeepers contest elections. Under such conditions, direct local elections have 
benefited only selected elites, challenging the dominant assumption that the country's 
recent political reforms would herald the arrival of local democracy.
Through the analysis of Depok's and Banyuwangi's local elections, I have shown 
that intensified power struggles do not, in and of themselves, improve the quality of 
local politics and governance in Indonesia. They rather reveal the fragility of formal 
democratic institutions in the face of entrenched elites' patrimonial domination. 
Formal institutional change should not be equated with substantive change in local 
politicians' behavior and practices. As Schulte Nordholt and van Klinken have 
observed, institutional changes at local levels tend, rather, to make certain hidden 
aspects of the state more explicit as they reveal the extent to which local actors use the 
state for their own interests.137 This is particularly true when decentralization creates 
greater space for local elites to build and develop informal networks with local state 
actors. When this happens, local institutions and processes turn out to be so fragile 
that, in some cases, such as those of Depok and Banyuwangi, local elites can 
manipulate them to further their private interests. Under a democratic and 
decentralized political system, Indonesia's local elites have managed to extend their 
informal networks into formal state institutions and governance. Furthermore, the 
country's recent experiment with direct local elections has exposed the stubborn, 
though changing, continuities that characterize old patterns of politics. Informal 
networks are still a key factor in local power struggles, particularly in societies where 
personalized state-society relations dominate politics and governance.
In the end, entrenched elites in Depok and Banyuwangi failed to secure their 
political monopoly over local power and governance. The ultimate outcomes of the 
cases demonstrate both the limits of entrenched elites' authority and the resilience of 
Indonesia's democratic institutions. In most other elections, however, politically 
powerful elites managed to win the elections, secure their control over local 
governance, and maintain their patrimonial domination without difficulty. 
Distinctively, the elections in Depok and Banyuwangi reveal the potential threat of
Implication for the Role of Civil Society," Commune Council Project Support, Phnom Penh, April 25-27, 
2005.
136 As the Centre for Political Study-Soegeng Sarjadi Syndicate (CPS-SSS) survey shows, and my other 
election cases demonstrate, many of the elected local government heads have turned out to be long- 
established and well-resourced local officials paired with local businessmen. See Sukardi Rinakit, 
"Indonesian Regional Elections in Praxis," IDSS Commentaries 65 (Singapore: Institute of Defence and 
Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 2005). Comparing the 2006 Papuan gubernatorial 
election with elections in other regions, Marcus Mietzner also points out that entrenched local political and 
economic elites dominated the contest for local governance: See Marcus Mietzner, "Local Elections and 
Autonomy in Papua and Aceh: Mitigating or Fueling Secessionism?" Indonesia 84 (2007): 1-39.
137 Schulte Nordholt and van Klinken, Renegotiating Boundaries, p. 24.
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decentralized power struggles. When new power-seekers' political aspirations clash 
with the entrenched elites' patrimonial operation of political institutions, democratic 
rules of the game seem incapable of changing old patterns of local politics, in which 
patrimonial relationships and practices still dominate. Although new leaders have 
shown some, though limited, change in their style of politics and policies, they also 
rely on patrimonial networks in operating local institutions, and particularly in facing 
the continuous challenge from the elites who have traditionally ruled local politics.
Direct local elections have certainly changed the political dynamics in Indonesia's 
regions. However, the direct local elections carried out in Depok and Banyuwangi 
have also revealed the unexpected and unintended dimension of Indonesia's changing 
local political system. Entrenched bureaucrats and affluent businesspeople have 
dominated local power struggles. Meanwhile, the intensified competition over local 
power and governance has not yet improved the quality of local democracy and state- 
society relations more broadly. Direct local elections have not reached a point where 
they empower local constituents to be able to jump onto the stage where political 
power is truly contested. What made the cases of Depok and Banyuwangi distinct from 
many other cases was that conflicts among contestants could not be settled by political 
compromise, and elite groups relied on mass mobilization and questionable stalling 
tactics. The two cases also demonstrate how the coincidence of formal democratic 
institutions, patrimonial domination, and emotional mass mobilization can easily 
destabilize local politics. Democratic institutions and procedures in local Indonesia are 
still vulnerable to the patrimonial manipulation of local elites, entrenched or not.
